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Foreword 
 
 
This document is about why an extension to the Brexit transition period is vital to our 
economic recovery from Coronavirus (COVID-19). 
 
In the referendum on membership of the European Union in June 2016 people in 
Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain. 
 
The Scottish Government’s position is well known: we have always vehemently 
opposed Brexit and see Scotland’s future as an independent country and an EU 
member state. That has not changed. 
 
That goal of becoming a full, equal member of the EU, committed to the founding 
values of human dignity, freedom, democracy and equality is at the heart of the 
Scottish Government’s ambition for Scotland. 
 
However, although there will be differences of opinion on Brexit and Scottish 
independence, I believe there is an immediate step that must be taken, given the 
unprecedented Coronavirus crisis, that can command widespread consensus. 
 
Although the UK has left the European Union, it is still able to benefit from most 
aspects of EU membership because it is in a “transition period” during which pre- 
Brexit rights and obligations apply in almost all areas. 
 
This transition period is due to finish on December 31, but it can be extended for up 
to a further two years as long as that is agreed by the end of June. After that date, it 
will not be possible to extend under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement – and no 
other plausible route to an extension has been put forward. We must therefore work 
on the basis that the end-June deadline for an extension is real. Without an 
extension, the UK would, on 1 January 2021, have to operate in an entirely new 
relationship with the EU.  
 
Given the huge economic hit caused by coronavirus it would be an act of 
extraordinary recklessness for the UK Government to refuse to seek an extension. 
 
That’s because the default plan is to leave in around seven months’ time with either 
only a very basic deal with the EU or no deal at all. 
 
That would mean Scotland, and the UK as a whole, being subjected to an entirely 
unnecessary second economic and social shock on top of the COVID-19 crisis. More 
jobs would be lost, living standards would be hit and essential cooperation would be 
damaged. For many businesses which manage to survive the coronavirus crisis, this 
second, Brexit, shock would hit them at their weakest, and be the final straw to put 
them out of business. Each business lost is a permanent reduction in Scotland’s 
productive capacity, and thus in our long-term prospects for inclusive, sustainable 
growth. 
   
3 
 
Whatever one’s opinion, in principle, of the merits of Brexit, that approach makes no 
sense. I believe there is a growing common-sense coalition to press for an extension 
to avoid such a disastrous outcome. 
 
In this paper the Scottish Government sets out the evidence to back up the 
arguments for an extension to the transition and I look forward to working with others 
to put forward the case during this unprecedented time.  
 
 
 
Michael Russell 
 
Cabinet Secretary for the Constitution, Europe and External Affairs 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
Despite Scotland having voted to remain, the UK has left the EU. But – though Brexit 
has already had a damaging impact on our economy – the main impact of leaving 
has not yet been felt because the UK is operating under transitional arrangements 
which ensure our producers, consumers and citizens continue to benefit from full 
membership of the EU single market.  
 
The transition period is scheduled to finish on 31 December 2020. This paper sets 
out why it is vital, if we are to ensure the most rapid recovery possible from the 
COVID-19 crisis, that the UK Government immediately seeks an extension to the 
transition period for up to two years. 
 
The Scottish Government, and the overwhelming majority of people in Scotland 
opposed Brexit. That remains the case. However, regardless of views on EU 
membership it is clear that COVID-19 has vastly increased the difficulties that firms 
across the country face in preparing for a hard Brexit (outside the Single Market and 
Customs Union) in December. Extending the transition period for a further two years 
is an appropriate and desirable economic measure that will support economic 
activity, employment and a speedier return to inclusive, sustainable growth.  
 
The arguments in favour of an extension are that: 
 It would allow the economy more time to recover from COVID-19 before 
experiencing the additional negative impact of ending the Brexit transition;  
 The COVID-19 pandemic has prevented government, business and citizens 
from preparing adequately for what will be the most significant change to our 
external trade policy for half a century; and 
 Proper democratic and technical scrutiny and implementation of the UK’s 
putative new relationship with the EU is simply not possible in the few months 
remaining before December this year – the end of the current transition 
period. 
 
Ending the transition period at the end of 2020, even with the type of basic deal the 
UK government is pursuing, or worse still without a deal with the EU at all, will 
represent a significant additional downside risk to the trajectory of the economic 
recovery. Immediate and short-run effects will include:   
 Introduction of non-tariff barriers to trade with the EU (and tariff barriers in a 
no deal outcome);  
 Increased disruption to supply chains already experiencing challenges due to 
COVID-19; and 
 Heightened uncertainty in some markets.  
 
The combined impact of these effects on businesses that are already severely 
affected by COVID-19 could result in widespread business closures and job losses 
over and above those resulting from COVID-19 alone. 
 
New economic modelling shows the impact of ending the transition period at end-
2020 or, with the full two-year extension provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement, 
at end-2022. We also model the impact of two outcomes to the current EU-UK 
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negotiations, either a basic Free Trade Agreement in line with the UK government’s 
unambitious aspirations, or no deal. The lack of progress in the negotiations so far 
and the impact of COVID-19 on the negotiating process make no deal a real 
possibility. These Brexit scenarios are overlaid on two illustrative paths for the 
recovery of the economy from COVID-19.  
  
The modelling indicates that ending transition this year would result in Scottish GDP  
being between £1.1 billion and £1.8 billion lower by 2022 (0.7 to 1.1% of GDP), 
compared with ending transition at the end of 2022. That would be equivalent to a 
cumulative loss of economic activity of between nearly £2 billion and £3 billion over 
those two years. A proportionate impact would be likely for the UK economy. This 
will clearly hamper recovery from the impact of the pandemic. 
 
Simply extending the transition period would thus postpone the costs of Brexit, which 
is crucial at this time. But beyond this – and in addition to the costs identified by the 
modelling – exiting the current transitional arrangements before Scotland has 
emerged from the COVID-19 crisis would greatly increase the costs of Brexit to the 
Scottish economy, in comparison to a two year extension. This is for two main 
reasons:  
 Because of COVID-19, Scottish companies will be in a much more fragile 
state and less able to absorb the impact of Brexit at the end of this year than 
in two years’ time; and 
 Because of the need, rightly, for both business and government to focus now 
on COVID-19, they will be less prepared now than they would be in two years, 
resulting in even greater disruption. This would be the case whether or not a 
deal is agreed. 
     
This paper also reports on the cumulative impact of the COVID-19 and Brexit shocks 
on key sectors. All sectors of the economy have been affected in some way by 
COVID-19 – many profoundly so – and will face a further adverse effect if the UK 
leaves the transition period in December. Analysis of exposure by sector shows the 
manufacturing and agrifood sectors to be particularly vulnerable to the additional 
shock of ending the transition period.  
 
There is also evidence, which this paper sets out, that both COVID-19 and Brexit 
have particular impacts on the most vulnerable sections of society. 
 
The impact of COVID-19 has exacerbated what was already an unrealistically tight 
timetable for governments and businesses to be ready to exit the transition period   
by the end of this year.   
 
A fundamental problem is that preparation for the arrangements that will need to be 
in place cannot be done with confidence, because those arrangements are still being 
negotiated. Simply knowing that the outcome will be somewhere between a basic 
FTA and no deal is not enough. Businesses still do not know, for example:  
 what tariffs there may or may not be on trade with the EU;  
 which regulations they should follow; 
 what Customs paperwork and processes will apply;  
 how people and data will be able to cross borders in order to make 
businesses work; or 
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 whether professional qualifications will be recognised.  
 
The case for extending the transitional period for a further two years is informed by 
the very real and inevitable damage to our economy, to our communities and to our 
citizens that – as evidenced in this paper – will result if the UK Government 
continues to pursue a policy of ending the transitional arrangements with the EU 
regardless of the consequences for our collective recovery from the most destructive 
global health and economic crisis in living memory.  
 
None of the arguments put forward by the UK government and others against an 
extension stand up to scrutiny: 
 Businesses do not want to remove uncertainty through a disorderly and 
damaging end to the transition period this year, when they will not have had 
time to prepare properly, but by having adequate time to prepare for an 
orderly move to a close future trading relationship with the EU; 
 Extending the transition period does not expose the UK to unquantified future 
budget commitments: under the Withdrawal Agreement the Financial Terms 
for Extension have to be agreed before an extension is agreed, so, If there is 
an extension, the UK will know and have agreed the financial implications in 
advance;  
 There is no basis to expect the EU to put in place regulatory measures 
damaging to the UK in any extension period: they have shown no inclination 
to do so during the current transition period, and, in any case, except for 
emergency measures,  EU legislation normally takes around two years to 
negotiate and implement. 
 
There have been suggestions that one motivation for rejecting an extension is to 
hide the adverse impact of Brexit In the bigger COVID-19 impacts: no responsible 
government could choose such a path, but no other convincing argument has been 
put forward. 
 
Opinion polls suggest that a clear majority of the UK population would favour an 
extension as a result of COVID-19.  Time is running out. After June 30 there will be 
no reliable way of extending the transition period. As a responsible administration 
which, notwithstanding our fundamental opposition to Brexit, is working to protect 
Scotland’s interests in the Brexit process, we call upon the UK Government to act 
now to secure an extension to the end of 2022.  
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Introduction  
 
 
Despite Scotland having voted to remain, the UK has left the EU. It is operating 
under transitional arrangements, agreed upon with the EU under the Withdrawal 
Agreement, which are currently scheduled to finish on 31 December 2020 – around 
seven months from now.   
 
Once the transition period ends, the UK will have a whole new relationship with the 
EU, the precise shape of which is not known because negotiations are taking place 
right now. That relationship will include new arrangements for how UK goods and 
services access the EU Single Market – which, at 450 million people, is around 
seven times the size of the UK alone - and how the UK and the EU operate together 
across a range of policy issues such as security, law enforcement and judicial 
cooperation, environmental protection, energy, transport, and research and 
development.   
   
The self-imposed deadline of 31 December 2020 was originally designed by the then 
UK government to give a transition period of 21 months for negotiating, ratifying and 
implementing the new relationship. The UK Government chose to include scope for 
an extension of up to a further 24 months, should more time be needed. Although 
the Brexit process has been delayed, the deadline has not yet been adjusted, with 
the result that the time remaining is only a third of that originally foreseen. 
 
Given the lack of time, and the fundamental differences between the EU and UK 
positions, a no deal outcome at 31 December 2020 is only too possible. In that 
scenario, UK and Scottish exporters of goods and services to the EU would face 
tariff and non-tariff barriers that would significantly reduce, and in some cases 
effectively cut off, their access to the Single Market. But, even if an agreement were 
to be reached, the UK government’s level of ambition for the agreement is now so 
low that the negative impact would be almost as great as under a no deal outcome, 
due to a host of new non-tariff obstacles to our goods and services. 
 
Even in normal times, this kind of damage to Scotland’s interests would be 
unacceptable. But we are operating in times that are far from normal. The COVID-19 
pandemic has triggered an unprecedented global economic crisis. It is impossible to 
know how long this crisis will last, or the ultimate consequences it will have for our 
citizens, our communities, our businesses or our economic prospects. But what we 
do know is that the economy will still be adjusting to an unprecedented economic 
shock by the end of this year – when the Brexit transitional phase is currently 
scheduled to end. 
 
The UK is no longer a member of the EU, however much the Scottish Government – 
and the vast majority of people in Scotland who voted against it in 2016 – regret the 
loss of membership. But the full damage of Brexit has not yet been felt, thanks to the 
transitional arrangements under which the UK is now operating. The principal 
question we address in this paper is how long the transitional state should be 
maintained, to minimise the combined damage of COVID-19 and Brexit on the 
Scottish and UK economies. 
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Despite our opposition to Brexit – and the refusal of the UK government to involve 
devolved governments properly – the Scottish Government is doing everything it can 
to protect Scotland’s interests in the Brexit process. In this very singular context, we 
consider it essential that the UK Government seeks an extension of the transitional 
arrangements, before the 1 July deadline it agreed in the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Subject to the agreement of the EU, which we fully expect would be forthcoming, the 
UK Government should extend the current transitional arrangements by the 
maximum of up to two years. 
 
As we will demonstrate, the case for an extension rests on three fundamental 
considerations. While our focus is clearly on the impacts on Scotland, our analysis 
also touches on some wider impacts for the UK of failing to extend the transition 
period. 
 
The most important consideration concerns the consequences of introducing more 
economic and social turmoil to a UK economy already deeply in crisis as a 
consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic. Failing to extend the transition period 
would mean hitting the economy with the consequences of a hard Brexit at a time 
when it is already unprecedentedly fragile. Companies that might otherwise have 
managed to resume full operations, despite the effects of COVID-19, would face 
additional headwinds. The impact on Scotland’s economy and our productive 
potential would be long term. This paper sets out our analysis of those risks and 
impacts, for the Scottish economy and for key sectors within it. 
 
That simultaneous double hit could be avoided by extending the transition period.   
 
The second consideration relates to the immense practical challenges faced by 
governments, businesses and others. Without an extension, all concerned will have 
only a few months to implement a workable framework for our economic, social and 
security relationships with the EU for many years to come. That framework has not 
even been negotiated and ratified yet, so the actual time available will be even 
shorter. Furthermore, COVID-19 will still be severely constraining the available 
bandwidth of governments and businesses. While it is true that the broad shape of 
the future relationship is clear – somewhere between no deal and a basic free trade 
agreement (FTA) – businesses, and everyone else adapting to new arrangements, 
need to know the details so that they can adjust systems, processes, and even entire 
business models. To suggest that the UK can be ready in time for 1 January 2021 is 
to recklessly deny reality. 
 
The third consideration revolves around the timetable for negotiations and the 
inadequacy of scrutiny and accountability across the UK’s four nations. The tight 
timescale, at a time when leaders on both sides are rightly fully occupied with 
handling the coronavirus crisis, increases the risk of a no deal outcome. The biggest 
change in the UK’s international relationships in a generation must not be carried out 
without proper scrutiny by and involvement of the Westminster parliament and the 
devolved institutions. That has not happened to date; whilst an extension alone will 
not guarantee it happens, what can be guaranteed is that without an extension it will 
be impossible. 
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We will argue in this paper that these considerations taken together constitute a 
compelling case for using the option for an extension that was sensibly included in 
the Withdrawal Agreement. These arguments are more than enough to justify an 
extension, even for those who see Brexit as an opportunity, since the reality is that 
the UK has left the EU and the most immediate issue now is how to manage the end 
of transition in the least damaging way. But an extension to the transition would also 
allow for a re-evaluation of the UK’s current approach to the future relationship, to 
take account of the long term impacts of the pandemic.     
 
While clearly putting in place arrangements for an extension will itself require some 
effort, this will be modest. It should not impact on business, which will simply see a 
continuation of existing arrangements. The most frequently cited objection to an 
extension, of continuing UK financial contributions, with the potential for the UK to 
have to contribute to EU COVID-19 recovery programmes is simply incorrect. The 
Withdrawal Agreement itself recognises that, in the event of an extension, the 
financial terms will change, reflecting the fact that the EU will enter a new 
Multiannual Financial Framework Period at the end of 2020 and the UK will no longer 
be part of major programmes such as Common Agricultural Policy payments. The 
Withdrawal Agreement provides for a revised contribution to be agreed between the 
UK and EU reflecting this new situation. The size of this contribution resulting from 
an extension will be significantly less than during the current transition period, and 
very small compared with the loss of economic growth the UK would suffer without 
an extension, even if an FTA were agreed and implemented by the end of 2020. 
Most importantly, the size of the contribution (other than for specific programmes in 
which the UK wishes to participate) would, under the terms of the Withdrawal 
Agreement, need to be agreed before any decision to extend the transition period, so 
the UK Government would be able to take a decision on extension in full knowledge 
of the financial implications. 
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Section 1: Why an Extension to the Transition Period is Essential 
 
 
1.1 Economic Analysis  
 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused Governments across the world to shut down 
large sections of the economy to deal with the public health crisis, resulting in a 
collapse in global economic activity that is steeper and faster than in previous 
downturns and presenting an uncertain path for economic recovery. What began as 
a public health crisis is now also an economic crisis.  
 
COVID-19 also has significant implications for the UK’s exit from the European 
Union. The path that the economy will be on by the end of transition, scheduled for 
31 December 2020, will be fundamentally changed. Additionally, as we consider in a 
later chapter, the likelihood that the EU and UK will be able to reach a timely 
agreement on new arrangements will be seriously affected.   
 
COVID-19 has created unprecedented uncertainty for world trade, with current 
forecasts by the WTO suggesting anything between a 13% and 32% fall in world 
trade in 20201.  
 
Illustrative analysis of the potential short run impact on GDP during the COVID-19 
outbreak2 indicates that output in the Scottish economy could fall by 33% in the 
current quarter, primarily because of physical distancing and its implications for 
business closures and temporary reductions in operations.3 
 
These results are broadly in line with estimates and models for other countries 
around the world, including the Bank of England, the OBR and OECD; see Figure 1, 
below.   
  
                                                          
1 World Trade Organisation Press Release, Trade set to plunge as COVID-19 pandemic upends 
global economy 
2 Official economic forecasts for Scotland are undertaken by the Scottish Fiscal Commission 
3 This analysis is based on the same scenarios as the Scottish Government report, State of the 
Economy: April 2020, which assumed three months of physical distancing. It is likely that scenarios 
will be updated or new scenarios published as data emerges on the extent of COVID-19 impacts and 
the path for resumption of economic activity. 
11 
 
Figure 1: Potential Economic Impact – During Period of Social Distancing  
 
 
 
Implications of Ending the Transition Period in December 2020 
 
The severe economic impact of COVID-19 was clearly not foreseen during the first 
phase of negotiations between the UK and EU.    
 
If the UK were to exit the transitional arrangements at the end of 2020 with anything 
less than a comprehensive trade deal (which the UK Government is not currently 
seeking), this would represent a significant additional downside risk to the trajectory 
of the economic recovery from the COVID-19 shock. Such a scenario would have 
serious implications both for the short to medium-run economic recovery and for the 
long-run economic outlook. Short-run effects would include: 
 tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade with the EU; and 
 disruption to supply chains which are already experiencing challenges as a 
result of COVID-19; and heightened uncertainty in some markets, potentially 
weighing against the prospects of a recovery from the COVID-19 downturn, 
which could negatively impact business sentiment, investment, and 
consumption.  
The combined impact of these effects on the operations of businesses that are 
already severely affected by COVID-19 and struggling with lower demand and 
consequent cash-flow issues could result in: 
 business closures and job losses over and above the potential losses that 
would result from COVID-19 alone. 
 
With or without an FTA, the impact would vary across sectors, as we set out later.  
These short-run impacts could be mitigated to some extent by policy responses, 
including fiscal stimulus. However, Governments across the UK are already 
providing unprecedented support to the economy in response to COVID-19, reducing 
the room for further mitigating policies to address the additional impacts of EU exit. 
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Modelling 
 
The economy will recover from the current impacts of COVID-19 but the shape and 
speed of adjustment are uncertain.  
 
The scale of the COVID-19-related economic shock is now becoming more apparent 
as real data begins to emerge. UK GDP data for Q1 2020 indicated that output in the 
economy declined by 2% over the quarter driven by a 5.8% decline in March. The 
Bank of England has published illustrative analysis that estimates that the UK 
economy could decline by around 14 per cent in 2020, this would be the largest 
annual decline in economic output in 300 years. The Bank also estimated that 
unemployment may increase to nine per cent in the second quarter of this year, 
higher than in the wake of the 2008/9 financial crisis, up from around four per cent in 
February and is estimated to remain at 7% in 2021. The scale of the increase in 
unemployment has yet to emerge in the data. However, Scottish Government 
analysis referenced earlier in this paper indicates that a 33% decline in output could 
be associated with the rate of unemployment increasing to up to around 10% in 
Scotland. 
 
Recent analysis by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) 
suggests that some of these impacts could become permanent, estimating that 
“scarring” caused by the COVID-19 shock could take as much as 3% off long-term 
GDP. 
 
The shape of the medium-term economic recovery is subject to several key 
uncertainties:  
i. How long physical distancing measures will need to be in place to ensure 
public health is protected; 
ii. Whether or not the size and scale of the temporary downturn causes more 
long-lasting supply-side damage to the productive capacity of the economy; 
iii. The impact that fiscal and monetary responses will have; and 
iv. The global nature of the crisis, with economic spill-over effects from other 
countries both in terms of trade and policy responses.  
 
Ending the Brexit transition period at the end of 2020 would provide an additional 
headwind to this already uncertain recovery. 
 
We have already published detailed analysis of the potential impact on the economy 
of an exit based on the type of unambitious deal the UK government favours; 
previous Scottish Government modelling of an EU-UK FTA estimated that GDP 
could be around 6.1% lower in the long term compared to EU membership under a 
similar scenario.4   
 
In this paper we are publishing new modelling looking specifically at the risks posed 
by exiting the transition period at the end of 2020 in combination with the impacts of 
the COVID-19 crisis. 
 
                                                          
4 Scotland’s Place in Europe: People, Jobs and Investment  
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Two5 illustrative scenarios for COVID-19 modelled using the Scottish Government’s 
Global Econometric Model (SGGEM) have been extended to include potential 
impacts of Brexit, giving further illustrative paths for the economic recovery. In terms 
of COVID-19 recovery, one scenario illustrates a single wave of infection followed by 
a single (‘v-shaped’) recovery, where the other is an illustration of how a second 
wave of infection, if one were to occur, could lead to a second economic impact and 
a ‘w-shaped’ recovery. Both scenarios assume a resumption of the pre-COVID-19 
status quo, including continuation of trade with the EU on current terms.   
 
It should be noted these additional scenarios do not represent a central prediction or 
medium term forecast; the aim of this analysis is to explore how the economy could 
be further impacted by different Brexit outcomes, through EU trade and migration 
channels which this modelling takes into account. For more information on the 
approach, please see footnote6.   
 
We have then, against the background of these two illustrative COVID-19 scenarios, 
shown a range of possible Brexit outcomes: ending the transition period either at the 
end of 2020, as currently scheduled, or at the end of 2022, as would be the case 
with a two-year extension; and exiting the transition period into either a basic FTA, or 
no deal. 
 
The impacts of COVID-19 and of Brexit outcomes are modelled separately and 
overlaid on top of each other rather than interacting in any more complex way. This 
is a necessary simplification. In reality the situation would be more complex, for 
reasons that include those described earlier, and the real-world, short-term 
outcomes might be expected to be worse than those illustrated by the modelling. 
 
No additional assumptions have been made about shocks to uncertainty or 
investment as result of Brexit. For example, the impact of ending the transition period 
at the end of 2020 could, on top of the impact of COVID-19, result in additional 
operating and financing impacts that might have been avoided by postponing the 
Brexit impact. 
 
The results of this new modelling are summarised in Figures 2 and 3, below, and in 
Annex A.  
  
                                                          
5 State of the economy: April 2020 
6 The aim of this analysis is to explore how the economy could be further impacted through EU trade 
and migration channels. All modelling was carried out separately, and as such no assumptions have 
been made about how the economic impact of COVID-19 could worsen or dampen the impact of a 
no-deal Brexit. For SGGEM modelling of COVID-19 see: https://www.gov.scot/publications/state-
economy-april-2020/pages/6/. For similar CGE Brexit modelling used here see supporting file of: 
https://www.gov.scot/publications/state-economy-february-2019/ 
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Figure 2: Illustrative Scenarios of Possible Macroeconomic Paths of the Scottish Economy with an FTA Brexit Outcome at the End of 2020 or 
the End of 2022 
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A) Temporary Demand Shock - V shape recovery - no change in trade relationship with the EU
B) Temporary Demand Shock - V shape recovery with FTA Brexit at end of 2020
C) Temporary Demand Shock - V shape recovery with FTA Brexit at end of 2022
D) Cyclical Shocks with Damage to Productive Capacity - no change in trade relationship with the EU
E) Cyclical Shocks with Damage to Productive Capacity - with FTA Brexit at end of 2020
F) Cyclical Shocks with Damage to Productive Capacity with FTA Brexit at end of 2022
End of 2020 End of 2022 
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Figure 3: Illustrative Scenarios of Possible Macroeconomic Paths of the Scottish Economy with a No Deal Brexit Outcome at the End of 2020 or 
the End of 2022 
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Change in GDP (%) under the Illustrative Scenarios
A) Temporary Demand Shock - V shape recovery - no change in trade relationship with the EU
B) Temporary Demand Shock - V shape recovery - with no-deal Brexit at end of 2020
C) Temporary Demand Shock - V shape recovery - with no-deal Brexit at end of 2022
D) Cyclical Shocks with Damage to Productive Capacity - no change in trade relationship with the EU
E) Cyclical Shocks with Damage to Productive Capacity - with no-deal Brexit at end of 2020
F) Cyclical Shocks with Damage to Productive Capacity - with no-deal Brexit at end of 2022
End of 2020 End of 2022 
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Coronavirus Scenarios 
 
Scenarios A, B and C on these graphs represent an illustrative scenario in which the 
economy has partially recovered from the large demand shock in the second quarter 
of 2020 and is on its path to economic recovery. Scenarios D, E and F represent a 
hypothetical deeper COVID-19 shock and an illustration of how a second wave of 
infection, if one were to occur, could lead to a second economic shock. This second-
round impact represents a second significant reduction in international trade levels, 
which means that, in these scenarios, trade is already at a very low level when the 
impact of Brexit is overlaid.  
 
 
The Impact of Brexit Outcomes 
 
The four possible Brexit outcomes overlaid on top of the two COVID-19 scenarios 
are ending the transition period either at the end of 2020 or at the end of 2022, and 
moving thereafter into either a basic FTA or no deal. 
 
In the no deal Brexit outcomes, the economic path diverges from the illustrative 
baseline due to the immediate introduction of UK-EU trade barriers and lower 
investment prospects. Following this immediate impact on GDP, this economic 
impact worsens over time for two principal reasons. 
 
Firstly, in addition to declines in existing trade, future Scottish-EU trade is foregone 
with less trade being created than would have occurred otherwise. Scottish exports 
into the EU single market lose competitiveness with the cost of Scottish goods and 
services being higher due to tariffs and non-tariff barriers. 
 
Secondly, net annual EU migration is likely to fall. With each year following EU exit 
seeing lower levels of net-EU migration, the level of foregone migration accumulates 
over time. This results in smaller pools of available workers each year than would 
have been the case, putting upward pressure on production costs as well as 
reducing prospects of business expansion. All of these contribute to a prolonged 
period where trade levels never recover fully, and GDP is permanently lower in the 
long term. 
 
In the Brexit outcomes with an agreed FTA, it is assumed that there are no tariffs on 
EU-UK trade – but the other economic impacts, including non-tariff barriers and the 
net migration effect, still apply.   
 
In terms of timing, the graphs show clearly that, depending on the COVID-19 
scenario, ending Brexit transition at the end of 2020 or at the end of 2022 has a 
significant impact on the extent to which the economy has been able to recover from, 
or is still suffering the effects of, the pandemic. As would be expected, the worst 
illustrative outcome would be a ‘W-shaped’ COVID-19 scenario with Brexit transition 
ending at the end of 2020 without a deal.   
 
Every year, EU single market access brings economic benefits to the Scottish 
economy. An extension will provide more breathing space for businesses still dealing 
with the aftermath of the COVID-19 downturn. Extending the transition period will 
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also enable further negotiations for extended market access without any trade or 
migration restrictions, bringing benefits to these years and delaying the impacts that 
Brexit will have on the Scottish economy. 
 
Ending the EU exit transition period at the end of 2020 would increase frictions in the 
economy at a time when companies will be in a fragile state, still dealing with the 
financial implications of the recession, and less able to manage and absorb the 
impact than they would be in two years’ time. The transition period was supposed to 
be used to prepare for the UK’s departure from the EU Single Market, allowing both 
business and government to implement processes in order for them to ensure 
compliance with new trading arrangements. However, COVID-19 has meant that 
firms have had to spend this period dealing with the challenges caused by the 
pandemic, managing an unprecedented decline in demand and the associated 
implications that this has had for cash flow. The COVID-19 shock will also create a 
more indebted business base further depressing business investment, which was 
already at muted levels prior to the crisis. 
 
With the economy unlikely to have fully recovered at the beginning of 2021, even in a 
best case scenario, the additional structural changes forced on business by leaving 
the EU could undermine current attempts to support the economy. 
 
Figure 4, below, illustrates the economic impacts that would be avoided by extending 
the transition period by two years. The modelling indicates that simply extending the 
transition period for two years would leave Scottish GDP between £1.1 billion and 
£1.8 billion higher by the end of 2022 (between 0.7 and 1.1 percent of GDP). This 
would constitute vital support to the Scottish economy, and public finances, as 
Scotland recovers from the COVID-19 shock, and would be equivalent to avoiding a 
cumulative loss of economic activity of up to £3 billion over those two years. This 
Figure shows only the additional costs of ending the transition period in 2020, 
compared to 2022. It does not include the annual costs of leaving the transition 
period in 2022 compared to remaining in the Single Market and Customs Union.  
 
Not only would shifting the date see a saving of up to £1.8 billion of economic output 
in Scotland in each of the next two years, it would avoid additional adverse effects, 
not included in this modelling, from hitting Scottish businesses with a new shock 
when they have only begun to recover from COVID-19, and when neither they nor 
Government have had the time to prepare. 
 
The modelling confirms earlier modelling results that leaving the EU is a negative 
outcome for the economy whenever it is undertaken. In the event that transition is 
ended with an FTA or a no-deal Brexit at the end of 2022, the benefits provided by 
the transition period would slowly disappear over time as the full impact of Brexit is 
realised from that year and every year onwards. 
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Figure 4: The Reduction in Scottish GDP Due to Ending the Transition Period at the End of 2020 in No-Deal-Brexit and FTA Scenarios 
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Figure 4 (continued): The Reduction in Scottish GDP Due to Ending the Transition Period at the End of 2020 in No-Deal-Brexit and FTA 
Scenarios 
 
 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 
Foregone GDP due to ending transition with an FTA 
at the end of 2020 (QNAS 2018 current prices) 
 
-£691m -£1,147m -£1,068m -£1,093m -£803m -£547m -£397m 
Impact on GDP of ending transition with an FTA at 
the end of 2020 (% difference from ending transition 
at the end of 2022 with an FTA) 
-0.4% -0.7% -0.7% -0.7% -0.5% -0.3% -0.2% 
Foregone GDP due to ending transition with a no-
deal Brexit at the end of 2020 (QNAS 2018 current 
prices) 
-£1,109m -£1,844m -£1,665m -£1,658m -£1,197m -£768m -£508m 
Impact on GDP of ending transition with a no-deal 
Brexit at the end of 2020 (% difference from ending 
transition at the end of 2022 with a no-deal Brexit) 
-0.7% -1.1% -1.0% -1.0% -0.7% -0.5% -0.3% 
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Long-Term Implications 
 
In the long term, a wide range of evidence7 has shown that Brexit will limit the 
economy by imposing restrictions on trade, investment, migration and productivity. 
A recent publication by NIESR outlined the long-term implications of leaving the 
Single Market and instead entering into a Free Trade Agreement with the EU: "In the 
long term leaving the EU single market and customs union is expected to reduce 
GDP by 3–4 percent relative to what it would have been had the UK remained in the 
EU"8. Previous Scottish Government modelling of an FTA scenario estimated that 
GDP could be around 6.1% lower in the long term compared to a scenario of 
continued EU membership.9 
 
A no-deal Brexit scenario has greater economic implications and could see the 
economy 8.5% smaller by 2030 compared to a scenario of continued EU 
membership.  
 
For comparison, the UK Government’s own analysis shows a Free Trade Agreement 
with the US would only increase UK GDP by up to 0.16% over a similar time period.  
 
 
Sectoral Analysis 
 
This section focuses on the sectoral implications of the Brexit outcome in the context 
of COVID-19. It draws on recent COVID-19 analysis published in the latest Scottish 
Government ‘State of the Economy’ report10, alongside economic analysis of the 
sectoral implications of a WTO Brexit outcome11.  
 
This analysis focuses on the international dimension of COVID-19. It examines how 
sectors that have been exposed to changes in international trade through COVID-19 
could be further affected by tariffs and regulatory barriers that could be introduced at 
the end of 2020 as a result of Brexit. This would be in addition to the impact of the 
domestic public health measures on the viability of different sectors. The agriculture, 
fishing and manufacturing sectors would face some of the highest increases in trade 
costs – through the introduction of customs controls, rules of origin and non-tariff 
barriers. In the event of a no-deal outcome these sectors would also face tariffs and 
quotas. Key service sectors, such as financial and professional services, would face 
disruption as a result of regulatory barriers.  
 
The COVID-19 situation is highly uncertain, and the interaction with Brexit is heavily 
dependent on how long it is necessary to maintain restrictive measures for, and the 
speed of recovery, both domestically and abroad. The Scottish Government’s State 
                                                          
7 Examples include Ebell, M., Hurst, I., & Warren, J. (2016). Modelling the Long-Run Economic Impact 
of leaving the European Union National Institute of Economic and Social Research; OECD. (2016) 
The Economic Consequences of Brexit Taxing Decision & FAI (2016) – Long-term Economic 
Implications of. Brexit. A report for the Scottish Parliament 
8 National Institute Economic Review No. 252 May 2020  
9 Scotland’s Place in Europe: People, Jobs and Investment 
10 State of the Economy: April 2020 
11 This refers to a scenario in which the UK starts trading on World Trade Organisation terms with the 
EU following departure from the EU. See Annex A for further technical details of this analysis. 
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of the Economy publication in April 202012 highlighted that the three main channels 
for economic impact from COVID-19 are: 
 International supply exposure (% of intermediate use sourced 
internationally); 
 International and domestic demand exposure (changes in international & 
domestic demand); and 
 Labour market disruption (sectors exposed to labour supply disruption 
through social distancing guidance, absences and existing labour supply 
shortages). 
 
Brexit represents an additional risk to the sectors already exposed to those COVID-
19-related channels, especially through the international (specifically EU) supply and 
demand exposures and the impact of removal of Freedom of Movement of Workers 
on labour supply. 
 
Figure 5, below, outlines the relative exposure of sectors in Scotland, using a no-
deal Brexit to illustrate the most severe level of risk. 
 
 
                                                          
12 State of the Economy: April 2020 
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Figure 5: Sectoral Exposures to a No-Deal Brexit and COVID-19 
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These exposures are necessarily presented at an aggregated level in order to align 
with modelled outputs from both our Brexit and COVID-19 modelling. As such there 
will be variation at firm level. Simply because a firm is not in the red category does 
not mean the impacts are limited. On the contrary, for many firms within the amber 
and yellow sectors the impact of COVID-19, although on average less extreme than 
in the most exposed sectors, will still be enough to jeopardise their future prosperity, 
or indeed existence.   
 
Within the impacts of Brexit, a key factor is different sectors’ exposure to the 
potential introduction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. These will be introduced with a 
no-deal outcome and, potentially, for some products, in an FTA outcome. Exposure 
to tariffs has two elements: the higher price of UK goods and services in the EU 
market; and increased costs of production and consumption within the UK if tariffs 
are applied to imports from the EU.   
 
As shown in Figure 6 below, EU tariffs vary considerably across product groups. For 
some sectors, or individual products within sectors (e.g. red meat), tariffs themselves 
are high. But for many sectors and products and, in particular, for trade in services, 
non-tariff barriers such as regulatory and customs procedures are more significant. 
 
Figure 6: World Trade Organisation – European Union Tariffs on Imports13 
  EU MFN applied duties  
Product groups Simple 
Average 
(%) 
Products 
duty-free 
(%) 
Maximum 
duty 
Applied 
(%) 
Animal products 17.9      28.4     152 
Dairy products 43.7         0     235 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 10.7      19.8     218 
Coffee, tea 5.9      27.1      16 
Cereals & preparations 14.9       7.8      51 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 5.5      48.1     112 
Sugars and confectionery 27.5      11.8     140 
Beverages & tobacco 19.8      18.4     152 
Cotton 0.0     100.0       0 
Other agricultural products 3.3      65.5      75 
Fish & fish products 11.6       7.4      26 
Minerals & metals 2.0      50.0      12 
Petroleum 2.5      33.7       5 
Chemicals 4.6      22.3      13 
Wood, paper, etc. 0.9      81.5      11 
Textiles 6.5       2.1      12 
Clothing 11.5         0      12 
Leather, footwear, etc. 4.1      27.2      17 
Non-electrical machinery 1.8      23.9      10 
Electrical machinery 2.4      23.9      14 
Transport equipment 4.7      12.9      22 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 2.2      28.4      10 
 
  
                                                          
13 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/daily_update_e/tariff_profiles/E28_E.pdf 
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Sectoral Exposure 
 
Our analysis suggests that the sector most exposed to the combined effects of Brexit 
and COVID-19 is manufacturing, given its level of international integration. As 
discussed above there will be variation; for example, sectors such as food and drink, 
manufacturing, chemicals and life sciences will face higher tariff and non-tariff 
barriers than some other sectors within the wider manufacturing classification.   
Agriculture and fishing, where international supply and demand exposures 
associated with COVID-19 are lower but their exposure to the effects of Brexit is 
high, face a different challenge:- 
 Higher prices of UK produce in EU markets could lead to lower demand, 
resulting in permanently lower sector output and exports. 
 The imposition of UK tariffs, which would be a matter for the UK government, 
could boost domestic demand for these sectors, contributing to a reduced net 
overall impact. However, this would result in higher prices for domestic 
users/consumers. If the UK government responded by cutting tariffs to benefit 
consumers then this potential gain to the domestic industries would be 
reduced. 
 
In our analysis a number of other sectors have been identified as having a medium 
exposure to the effects of Brexit and medium or low relative exposure to COVID-19 
impacts. For example, we identify the Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 
sector as having medium exposure to both Brexit and the impacts of COVID-19 on 
international demand. This does not mean that these sectors are unaffected. On the 
contrary, for many firms within those sectors the impact of COVID-19, although less 
extreme than in the most exposed sectors, could still be enough to jeopardise their 
survival. Adding in the negative impact of Brexit could further compound these 
effects, leading to significantly reduced demand and, ultimately, the potential for 
business closures. 
 
All sectors have been affected in some way by COVID-19 and will be adversely 
affected by the UK leaving the transition period. The cumulative impacts in some 
specific sectors are described briefly here and more fully in Annex B:- 
 
 COVID-19 has caused major disruption for the transport sector and at EU-UK 
borders, with cold storage capacity nearly full. The preparations businesses 
will have to make to plan for new border arrangements at the end of the 
transition period, deal or no deal, will be complex. For example, new 
compliance measures could necessitate at least 200 hours of training for each 
employee or outsourcing to customs intermediaries, of which there is a 
shortage. 
 
 Manufacturing has been particularly hard hit by COVID-19 and, even with a 
deal, it will face major additional challenges at the end of the transition period. 
The complex international supply chains on which companies rely have been 
significantly impacted. UK companies will be at a severe disadvantage when 
working to maintain their places in those supply chains after COVID-19 if they 
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are also facing the cost and disruption of new border controls and customs 
restrictions at the end of 2020. Recovery will be further inhibited by loss of 
freedom of movement of workers. 
 
 Tourism is one of the sectors most severely impacted by COVID-19 and 
ending freedom of movement of EU workers, in the absence of a similar route 
for migrants, will make it more difficult to recruit the workforce needed to drive 
recovery. 
 
 In the food and drink sector, businesses’ capital, cash flow and capacity have 
all been reduced by COVID-19, leaving them short of the resources needed 
for no deal preparations. Some key Scottish exports, such as beef and lamb, 
face the risk of prohibitively high EU tariffs as well as new non-tariff 
requirements, including for Export Health Certificates. Retailers had intended 
that greater local sourcing would help mitigate supply problems but COVID-19 
has made it difficult to engage with potential alternative suppliers. Moreover, 
the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted UK producers’ heavy reliance on migrant 
workers and they are struggling to source the labour needed to harvest crops.  
 
 The fishing industry’s supply chains to the major markets in Europe have been 
severely disrupted by COVID-19. Even with a deal, the end of the transition 
period will mean substantially more border controls and regulatory duplication; 
without a deal, tariffs will add further pressure. The industry’s capacity to 
absorb these shocks is much reduced, since they have already had to take 
steps such as reducing their catch and filling up cold stores in order to cope 
with COVID-19. Fragile rural communities would be hit hardest. 
 
 In addition to COVID-19, the oil and gas industry has had to face the impact of 
the collapse in oil prices. An extra period within the EU’s trading arrangements 
would remove a further source of instability: even with a deal, current UK 
Government plans would put UK refiners at a competitive disadvantage; and a 
no deal outcome would mean tariffs for exports to the EU. 
 
 Maintaining the supply of medicines and pharmaceuticals was an important 
issue in previous EU exit planning. The system for managing shortages of 
medicines and pharmaceuticals in the UK is under enormous strain as a result 
of COVID-19, which places increased risk on its capacity to manage 
disruption resulting from the end of the transition period. Handling a 
pandemic, when the search for a vaccine is intense, is also a dangerous time 
to disrupt the regulatory arrangements for approving medicines and vaccines. 
 
 The construction industry has faced supply chain disruptions from COVID-19, 
and will face workforce supply challenges as it recovers. Both of these issues 
will be exacerbated by an early end to the transition period, with or without a 
deal. Given the likely importance of infrastructure investment in the recovery 
from COVID-19, this could result in a major bottleneck. 
 
 Trade in services has been hit by COVID-19, due to restrictions on transport 
and travel and the temporary closure of businesses. Patterns of services trade 
may shift as a result of COVID-19 (with, for example, greater emphasis on 
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digitally-enabled cross-border trade in services rather than temporary 
movement of persons). Even with a deal, the end of the transition period will 
substantially increase barriers to trade in services, putting UK firms at a 
substantial disadvantage. The loss of freedom of movement of workers will 
also create workforce pressures. Both these effects will be particularly 
important in growth areas like digital services. 
 
 A rapid acceleration of progress is needed in the negotiations on cross-border 
trade in services, mobility, domestic regulation and Mutual Recognition of 
Professional Qualifications so that businesses can understand and manage to 
some extent the new barriers. With, at best, a very basic FTA in prospect and 
with no concrete information on progress towards an equivalence decision, 
financial services providers have been obliged to consider “no deal 
preparedness”: to continue trading they may need to move staff and activities 
to new EU hubs. COVID-19 has minimised the capital available for 
businesses to do this. It is also not yet clear what residence requirements EU 
states may apply to UK-based staff moving for work. The Irish Taoiseach Leo 
Varadkar has argued that the UK is highly vulnerable in this sector, telling the 
BBC14 in January that “You may have to make concessions in areas like 
fishing in order to get concessions from us in areas like financial services.” 
 
 In Higher Education, universities, whose business models were predicated on 
receiving significant numbers of overseas students, will face immediate 
financial pressures. Leading academics had already flagged up the difficulties 
which will result from ending freedom of movement from the EU and this will 
now be compounded with the challenges which reduced international travel 
will pose for research collaboration. 
 
 
Inclusive Growth 
 
In terms of the relative exposure of different parts of society, the Scottish 
Government published on 26 January this year a report entitled “Brexit: social and 
equality impacts”15, which analysed the potential impact of Brexit on the most 
vulnerable people in Scotland: 
“For instance, disabled people, minority ethnic communities, refugees and 
asylum seekers, and women, tend to be at a higher risk of poverty and 
insecure employment or unemployment than average … Given that 37% of 
households in Scotland (or 890,000 households) are considered to be 
'financially vulnerable', any negative impact on their household finances 
resulting from smaller UK economic growth – which the Treasury has forecast 
in relation to Brexit – could put further pressures on struggling households.” 
 
There is a body of emerging evidence that suggests that COVID-19 is also having a 
disproportionately negative economic impact on particular groups in society.16 
 
                                                          
14 BBC News article, Varadkar: EU will have stronger team in trade talks with UK 
15 Brexit: Social and Equality Impacts 
16 See for example https://www.resolutionfoundation.org/publications/risky-business/ and 
https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14791 
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In terms of COVID-19 harm, some groups such as older, disabled people and 
possibly ethnic minorities will be more affected by severity of disease. Women make 
up the majority of people providing care, both paid and unpaid, and the majority of 
health workers which may increase their risk of infection; women may also be more 
at risk of domestic abuse during relationship tensions in lockdown. Initial analysis of 
infection has shown that people in the most deprived areas were 2.3 times more 
likely to die with COVID-19 than those living in the least deprived areas. In addition 
to COVID-19 harm, we also recognise that there are much broader harms related to 
population health, social and economic impacts. These harms are also likely to 
disproportionately impact on those least able to cope. For example, initial analysis of 
labour market impacts has shown that those most likely to be hit hardest financially 
include low earners, younger people, women, ethnic minorities, disabled people, 
lone parents and those living in the most deprived areas of Scotland. Intersectional 
impacts compound this with many belonging to more than one group. Leaving the 
European Union without a trade agreement could further exacerbate the negative 
impacts on many people’s lives at a time when the economy is still recovering from 
the impact of COVID-19. 
 
While many of these impacts arise because groups are disproportionately 
represented in those sectors of the economy that have been, by and large, shut 
down, negative effects can persist in the longer term when individuals are not easily 
able to find new employment. For example, evidence suggests that lower skilled 
workers are less able to find jobs quickly in periods of weak economic conditions.17 
Women are less mobile than men on average (in terms of commuting distances) 
meaning they have a smaller pool of job opportunities, particularly in weaker labour 
markets.18 Experience of the 2008 recession also suggests that economic shocks 
can disproportionately affect minority ethnic groups and disabled people.19    
 
These detrimental impacts would be compounded by Brexit. Trade shocks can have 
significant distributional effects within an economy.20 Evidence suggests that it is 
those workers who are less able to move from declining to growing sectors that can 
suffer long-term negative impacts.21 A further economic shock caused by leaving the 
EU without a deal could make it more difficult for those displaced by COVID-19 to 
get back into employment.  
 
Those out of employment for extended periods of time are also more likely to 
become discouraged in the labour market or become long-term unemployed, with 
                                                          
17 https://www.spi.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Barnett_Paper_13-03__2_.pdf 
18 Ibid, also 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/articles/thecommut
inggapwomenaremorelikelythanmentoleavetheirjoboveralongcommute/2019-09-04 
19 After the 2008 recession there was a significant rise in the minority ethnic employment gap (the difference 
between employment rates of white and minority ethnic groups, ages 16-64), from 8.2 percentage points (Annual 
Population Survey, Jan-Dec 2007) to 14.8 percentage points (Annual Population Survey, Jan-Dec 2009). The 
employment rate of disabled people in Scotland was increasing prior to 2008, but the recession halted progress 
(Annual Population Survey). 
20 See for example https://blogs.sussex.ac.uk/uktpo/publications/winners-and-losers-from-international-trade-
what-do-we-know-and-what-are-the-implications-for-policy/ 
21 See for example http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/820801468156898298/Sticky-feet-how-labor-
market-frictions-shape-the-impact-of-international-trade-on-jobs-and-wages 
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the vulnerable groups mentioned above most likely to suffer these ‘scarring’ 
effects.22  
 
 
Summary of the Economic Analysis 
 
COVID-19 has led to the economy facing one of the steepest and fastest falls in 
economic output in history. EU exit represents a different type of shock: as outlined 
in Scotland’s Place In Europe, People Jobs and Investment, it reduces trade and 
investment, lowers migration and harms the productive capacity of the economy.  
Our analysis shows that the severity of the impact of Brexit is now dependent on 
both the form of the future relationship with the EU and, crucially, the timing of the 
end of transition. The worst of the Brexit outcomes we have modelled would be a no-
deal outcome at the end of 2020, with no extension to the transition period. Relative 
to a path where the UK remains in the Single Market, we would expect to see 
declines in existing trade, Scottish exports into the EU single market losing their 
competitiveness, and lower investment and reduced levels of net-EU migration. Our 
modelling illustrates, as a result, trade levels never recovering fully from a no-deal 
exit, and the economy permanently smaller in the medium to long term.  
 
Aside from the greater likelihood (as we will argue later) of avoiding a no-deal 
outcome, extending transition to the end of 2022 could avoid a loss of Scottish 
economic activity of over £1 billion during each of the next two, important years. This 
could provide vital support to an economy still recovering from the COVID-19 
recession. Extension would also avoid the further serious and, potentially, lasting 
sectoral and business-specific risks and impacts we have mentioned above, which 
could result from ending the transition when the economy is still recovering from the 
unprecedented COVID-19 shock. 
 
Our sectoral analysis shows manufacturing, agriculture and fishing to be particularly 
exposed to the combined impact of COVID-19 and Brexit. Analysis of the specific 
potential impacts of Brexit on equalities groups – including impacts on legal rights, 
public services and funding, and employment, housing and spending - showed that 
some equalities groups may be more affected by a loss of EU funding while others 
are more affected by loss of specific EU rights relating to their personal 
characteristics.23 
 
Previous Scottish Government analysis examined the medium- to long-term impact 
of Brexit-related economic shocks to trade flows, migration, investment and 
productivity24. Our earlier modelling suggested an FTA Brexit would reduce growth 
by around 6% over time. This latest analysis suggests that the range of outcomes of 
the negotiations could result in GDP being lower by up to 1.1% by 2022, compared 
to extending the transition and remaining inside the Single Market and Customs 
Union. 
 
                                                          
22 https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/research-report-47_the-equality-impacts-of-the-current-
recession_0.pdf 
23 Brexit: Social and Equality Impacts 
24 Scotland’s Place in Europe: People, Jobs and Investment 
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But this type of modelling is not designed to pick up some of the firm-level impacts of 
the type of issues that the close proximity of the COVID-19 and Brexit transition 
shocks will be likely to create, and which would significantly increase the adverse 
impact on growth. These are of two types in particular: 
 Businesses are more likely to fail, or be substantially weakened in the long 
term, as a result of the end of the transition period if they have just been 
substantially weakened by the impact of COVID-19; and 
 the fact that businesses and governments are, and will remain, largely 
devoted to tackling COVID-19 during the already limited time remaining in the 
transition period means that the extent of disruption at the end of the transition 
period will be substantially greater than would be the case if efforts could have 
been concentrated exclusively on Brexit preparation. 
 
It is hard to quantify these impacts, but the sector analysis set out above 
demonstrates that both factors will be significant in most sectors of the economy. 
Postponing the additional economic frictions and impacts that arise from leaving the 
EU would clearly be desirable. 
 
It may be tempting for some to think of the end of the Brexit transition period as a 
one-off shock, like removing a sticking plaster. “If the pain will be short-lived then 
why not get it over with?” Our analysis in this chapter has shown that this is far from 
being the case. The damage caused by Brexit will not be short-lived but serious and 
permanent; knowingly incurring this damage at the same time as the economy is 
reeling from the effects of COVID-19 is extremely reckless. By extending the 
transition period, we can avoid the double risk at the end of 2020 and potentially 
reduce – though not come even close to eliminating – the economic damage that 
Brexit will cause over the next decade compared with remaining within the European 
Single Market and Customs Union.  
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1.2 Practical Challenges to the Exit Process Resulting from COVID-19 
 
 
Impact on Government Readiness 
 
The impact of the pandemic not only exacerbates the economic risk associated with 
the end of the Brexit transition period; it is also delaying the technical, administrative 
and infrastructural preparations that will be required in the UK to implement the as-
yet-unknown new arrangements. 
 
For example, at border crossings there will need to be new arrangements for the 
movement of goods and citizens between the UK and EU. Appropriate checks will be 
needed, and staff will have to be recruited and trained. Administrative systems to 
support our exports will need to be in place, for instance if products of animal origin 
exported from the UK to the EU have to be accompanied by Export Health 
Certificates. With the ending of free movement of people from the EU, an entire new 
UK immigration system – a matter currently not devolved but reserved to the UK 
government – will need to be designed, legislated for, and in place by 1 January 
2021. 
 
The box below and Annex C show some specific and serious examples of areas 
where it is already clear that governments – both the UK government and, insofar as 
implementation is devolved, the devolved governments – will be unable to ensure a 
smooth handover on 1 January if the transition period is not extended. 
 
 
Example: Delivery of Customs Checks and Border Controls 
 
After the transition period, the checks and controls that need to be applied to UK 
imports and exports from and to the EU will be different. This means changes at 
Scottish ports and airports. Under the Northern Ireland Protocol, new measures 
are expected even for goods moving between Scotland and Northern Ireland.  
The extent of new measures that may be required is not yet understood or 
agreed, eating into the time that will be needed to design new systems and plan 
and implement their delivery. Additional capability and capacity will be required to 
administer new measures, including to process and respond to an increased 
volume of more complex Customs declarations and to manage additional Export 
Health Certification requirements. This means recruiting and training new customs 
officers, for which there is now insufficient time before the end of the year. New 
physical Border Control Posts may be needed in new locations to administer 
checks on products of animal origin moving between the island of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland; provision of new infrastructure takes time and planning to 
get right. If the checks and controls required to prevent smuggling and to ensure 
the safety and quality of products cannot be delivered effectively by the end of 
transition then trade would likely be affected; movement of some types of goods 
could be prevented. 
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At the same time, the UK Government and the devolved governments need urgently 
to put in place the systems and processes needed to implement the arrangements 
that the UK and the EU have already agreed in the Withdrawal Agreement, including 
the Protocol on Northern Ireland and Ireland. On 30 April the European Commission 
published a note25 listing the measures which the UK needs to put in place to give 
effect to the Protocol, the implementation of which is inextricably linked with the 
negotiations on the future EU-UK relationship. For example, whether or not tariffs will 
exist in future between the UK and the EU has implications for the border elements 
of the Protocol, and this cannot be prepared for whilst it is unclear whether the future 
relationship negotiations will result in an agreement.   
 
These very serious issues with the Protocol are, of course, especially difficult for the 
Northern Ireland Executive. They also create real practical problems in Scotland, for 
example in planning for new arrangements at our west coast ports from 1 January 
when the necessary shape of those arrangements is not known. In its 1 June report, 
the House of Lords European Union Committee concluded that “Even before the 
COVID-19 outbreak, Northern Ireland stakeholders described preparing for the 
Protocol to become operational on 1 January 2021 as a Herculean task; that task 
                                                          
25 European Commission Technical Note on the Implementation of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern 
Ireland 
 
Example: Access to the European databases 
 
Governments across Europe face serious challenges in preparing for the security 
aspects of the future EU-UK relationship and it looks increasingly unlikely that 
the UK will successfully negotiate similar access to the key law enforcement 
tools that Police Scotland and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
(COPFS) currently use in the fight against crime. However, even if those 
negotiations are successful, in many areas it may be simply impossible to have 
new arrangements in place for 1 January 2021. The technical and IT solutions 
required to operate new, as yet undetermined, arrangements for security 
cooperation must adhere to strict, important and complex requirements and 
standards, including for data security and data protection. Sufficient time must be 
allowed for proper design and implementation of the new systems and 
processes. The inevitable consequence of ending the transition period without 
new systems in place is, at best, a hiatus until new arrangements can be 
implemented and, at worst, a permanent loss of the security cooperation from 
which we have benefited for so long. The technical changes that would be 
required to the way that Scotland can access information in the European 
Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), if something akin to ECRIS 
access is indeed negotiated, is just one example that may take months to design 
and implement. Any gap in coverage would have a serious effect on Scottish 
Ministers’ vetting and barring functions under the Protection of Vulnerable 
Groups Act 2007, which is a crucial element in the protection of children and 
vulnerable adults. Similarly, any changes to the way Police Scotland access the 
Schengen Information System if access to that system is negotiated, may result 
in coverage gaps while that necessary new infrastructure is designed and put in 
place.  
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has become even more difficult, given the impact of COVID-19 on the economy and 
the capacity of individual businesses to cope with the problems confronting them.”26 
On 24 May, the Institute for Government wrote that “the chances of completing the 
work [to prepare for the Irish Sea border] in the current circumstances in less than 
eight months are remote.”27  
 
With around seven months to go before the transition period is due to end, the UK 
government has only now indicated it will share some of its implementation plans 
and assumptions with the devolved administrations, despite their crucial role in 
preparations, and in contrast to the much more open engagement in the run up to 
previous Brexit deadlines.   
 
 
Impact on Business Readiness 
 
The prospects for businesses are just as daunting as they are for governments, if not 
more so because for some their very survival is at stake. 
 
Even if a deal is achieved, the type of basic Free Trade Arrangement that the UK 
Government is now intent on pursuing will inevitably add to the costs businesses 
face when trading with the EU. It will require UK exporters to implement a wide range 
of administrative changes to comply with the rules for exporting from non-member 
states to the EU single market. This is clear from the revised advice the European 
Commission is issuing to EU stakeholders likely to be impacted by the end of the 
transitional arrangements:- 
“In particular, a free trade agreement does not provide for internal market 
concepts (in the area of goods and services) such as mutual recognition, the 
‘country of origin principle’, and harmonisation. Nor does a free trade 
agreement remove customs formalities and controls, including those 
concerning the origin of goods and their input, as well as prohibitions and 
restrictions for imports and exports.” 
 
The challenge for businesses adapting their administrative procedures and 
implementing new arrangements (changes to labelling; verification of compliance 
with relevant EU legislation; proof of origin etc.) would be considerable under any 
circumstances. Imposing an entirely new raft of administrative and regulatory 
obligations on businesses already struggling to recover from the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, at a time when they are least able to adapt, is bound to 
compromise their viability.   
Annex B lists some real practical examples of the difficulties businesses in different 
sectors will face if the transition period ends with no extension on 31 December while 
they are still reeling from the effects of COVID-19.   
Comments from a range of stakeholders confirm the Scottish Government’s view 
that an extension is essential. 
 
                                                          
26 House of Lords European Union Committee Report “The Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland” 
27 Institute for Government report, “Implementing Brexit: The Northern Ireland Protocol” 
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Carolyn Fairbairn, Director General of the Confederation of British Industry, wrote, 
on 1 June 2020:- 
“For many firms fighting to keep their heads above water through the crisis, 
the idea of preparing for a chaotic change in EU trading relations in seven 
months is beyond them. They are not remotely prepared. Faced with the 
desperate challenges of the pandemic, their resilience and ability to cope is 
almost zero.” 
 
The director general of the British International Freight Association (BIFA) has said 
that given the disruption to supply chains caused by COVID-19, it would be 
irresponsible of the UK government to try to abide by the timetable for ending its 
Brexit transition period, referring to a whole new set of uncertainties and a second 
shock if there is change in the terms of trade with the EU at the end of the year.   
 
The Freight Transport Association has said that the challenges posed by COVID-19 
will make the effective implementation of any new legislation impossible in the short 
term. This industry is petitioning the UK government urgently to seek an extension to 
the transition period, as well as suspending other planned domestic legislation which 
will impact the logistics sector. They say that the pandemic will have a significant 
impact on supplies of new equipment, technology and vehicles, as well as the 
industry’s ability to recruit and train new staff, and the challenge of adapting to new 
trading arrangements with the EU is placing logistics under huge and unnecessary 
pressures. "Our industry needs the support of government, not to be broken by it."  
 
The food industry, and its agricultural suppliers, have faced enormous supply and 
logistical problems. In April, Andrew Opie, Director of Food and Sustainability, British 
Retail Consortium, told the House of Commons International Trade Committee that: 
“Our resilience really relies on our trading relationship with our largest trading 
partner... There is no getting away from that: 80% of our food imports for 
supermarkets come from the EU. We rely on them heavily to supplement us 
when we are out of season, which is through the hungry years. That is the bit 
that we have to get right going forward: we must have a good trading 
relationship with the EU. That is vital to our consumers here… Northern 
Ireland consumers have the added issue of how we transport from our Great 
Britain depots into Northern Ireland without the checks being so excessive 
that they make the food almost unaffordable when it reaches the supermarket 
in Northern Ireland. I am sorry to bore everyone, but the EU-UK trade deal is 
fundamental to our resilience going forward… In terms of migrant workers, 
that is obviously a concern. We are going into the main seasonal harvest 
period. We are flipping over from Spain, Portugal and Italy into British 
produce. Tomatoes will go basically from 95% imports to the majority being 
produced here. Soft fruit, again, will flip almost 50% over to the UK, so we 
need the 80,000 migrant workers who would normally come to the country. I 
think that is going to be our real challenge.” 
 
The Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kristalina 
Georgieva, has warned against not extending the transition period, saying that 
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because of the "unprecedented uncertainty" arising from the pandemic, it would be 
"wise not to add more on top of it".28 
 
Two-thirds of over 1,000 businesses surveyed in the Highlands and Islands region in 
January/February 2020, before the full impact of COVID-19 had begun to be felt in 
the UK, felt that UK’s departure from the EU presented at least some risk to their 
business, rising to 74% amongst food and drink businesses.29 That region has also 
been hit heavily by the effect of COVID-19 on tourism. Scottish Enterprise and 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise have carried out extensive qualitative and 
quantitative research on the UK’s exit from the EU which, among other things, found 
that the impact of a no-deal exit would fall most heavily on the food and drink, life 
and chemical sciences, manufacturing, logistics and financial and business services 
sectors. 
 
The British Exporters Association (BExA) has reported that the disruption to, and 
loss of, labour is resulting in lower output in manufacturing and agrifood. The 
European Automobile Manufacturers Association (EAMA) has also stated that there 
is insufficient time available under the transitional arrangements given the COVID-19 
crisis.   
 
Strategy Director at the CBI, Nicole Sykes, tweeted on 1 May: 
“if company leadership is dealing with coronavirus, or … if their usual project 
teams are furloughed to stem the flow of cash out of the company, they are 
not dealing with Brexit. If you’re in new levels of debt as a result of 
coronavirus, you cannot afford to deal with Brexit. And you’ve just lost two 
months in which to get ready for Brexit.” 
 
One of the main reasons that businesses are in such an invidious position is that 
they will not know exactly what is required of them until the EU-UK negotiations are 
over and governments have worked out how the outcome – deal or no deal – will be 
implemented. As exemplified in the box below, the level uncertainty for businesses is 
very high, across a range of areas, with less than seven months left for them to 
complete preparations for the new business environment. That leaves businesses 
facing the awful dilemma of whether to: try and act now, without knowing what to 
prepare for and whilst still battling the worst of the COVID-19 impact; or to wait for 
more certainty about the new arrangements but in the knowledge that without an 
extension they will then have even less time to make themselves ready.   
                                                          
28 BBC News Article, IMF head warns on Brexit trade deal failure 
29 Wave 15 of the Highlands and Islands Enterprise (HIE) business panel survey 
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Impact on the Negotiations Process Itself 
 
In normal times, concluding an international agreement with the UK’s most important 
trading partner would be expected to take years rather than months. That would be 
especially true for an agreement which ought to go beyond trade and include 
domestic and international security, law enforcement and judicial cooperation, 
energy, transport, and so on.   
 
The fact that there are fundamental differences between what the EU and the UK 
see as acceptable in an agreement, as evidenced by their published starting 
positions, could only add to the time needed if the result were to be a fully 
comprehensive agreement. And yet the UK government, only weeks after signing the 
Withdrawal Agreement that sensibly included an extension option, ruled out using it 
under any circumstances. In other words, even before the effects of COVID-19, it 
 
Five Things Which Business Still Don’t Know So Can’t Prepare for Yet 
  
 Will there be Tariffs and what will they apply to?  
 
Businesses still don’t know what tariffs will be applied to which goods entering the 
EU (or entering the UK from the EU), or whether there will be no tariffs at all. 
  
 Which regulations to follow? 
 
Businesses still don’t know if you make something in the UK, to UK regulations and 
standards, whether those will be recognised in the EU (and vice-versa). 
  
 What customs paperwork and processes will be? 
 
Businesses still don’t know what they will have to provide at the border and whether 
UK certificates will be recognised (and vice-versa for the EU). Businesses don’t 
know how much of their products have to originate in the UK and EU to benefit from 
preferential trade terms. They also don’t know how this interacts with other trade 
agreements the UK and EU have which undermines businesses’ ability to plan their 
supply chains. 
  
 How will people and data cross borders to make businesses work? 
 
Businesses still don’t know the rules which would allow them to conduct business in 
the EU or what will need to be put in place to protect data to allow businesses to 
move information digitally. 
  
 Will professional qualifications be recognised? 
 
Business people don’t know which (if any) professional qualifications will be 
recognised in the EU. 
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seemed that the potential outcomes had narrowed down to a very basic, 
economically damaging deal or no deal at all. 
 
The practical impact of COVID-19 on the negotiating process makes that already 
recklessly ambitious timetable even more unrealistic. The original timetable agreed 
between the EU and the UK envisaged 5 rounds of negotiation between 2 March and 
16 May, followed by a stocktake in mid-June, but already the timetable has had to be 
revised and the number of rounds reduced. Leading figures in the negotiating teams 
themselves, on both UK and EU sides, have sadly fallen victim to the virus. Face-to-
face meetings between the negotiating parties are impossible.   
 
Undoubtedly the teams on both sides will have been making efforts to proceed as 
best they can in the circumstances by using video- and tele-conferencing. But 
experienced trade negotiators stress the importance, in normal negotiations, of the 
less formal, more personal channels of communication. Personal relationships 
between key individuals, informal conversations that can normally take place in the 
margins and coffee breaks of the formal negotiating sessions play a key role in the 
normal negotiating process. None of that is possible in the current circumstances, 
which means that apart from facing an immense negotiating task in policy terms, the 
two teams are at the same time having to invent a whole new modus operandi for 
the negotiations themselves.    
 
Moreover, rightly and properly, the Scottish and UK governments, and our 
counterparts across the EU, have pivoted huge amounts of staff and financial 
resource to tackling the human, social and economic impacts of the COVID-19 
pandemic. That means inevitably that staff previously working on or in support of the 
negotiations have had to be redeployed to COVID-19 on all sides – UK Government, 
EU Commission, and in the devolved administrations.  
 
In addition to negotiations with the EU, the UK Government is simultaneously having 
to negotiate continuity arrangements to rollover the existing EU–Third Country trade 
agreements which the UK benefited from as an EU member state. The difficulties 
mentioned above have also affected the UK Government’s programme for 
negotiating these continuity agreements: 19 out of approximately 40 agreements 
were signed by the end of January 2020, but no further agreements have been 
concluded since then.  
 
The difficulties set out here must increase the likelihood that, unless there is an 
extension which would allow more time for the negotiations, the UK and the EU fail 
to reach an agreement. The Withdrawal Agreement deliberately set a deadline of 1 
July for a decision on whether to extend the transition period. Though a number of 
ideas have been put forward for, in effect, achieving an extension of the transition 
period after the 1 July deadline, all suffer from fundamental legal, political and 
technical shortcomings and, in the highly unlikely event these proved surmountable, 
would require a substantial amount of time to negotiate and put into effect. We must 
work on the basis that a decision on an extension is needed urgently, and extension 
is effectively ruled out after 1 July.   
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Impact on Legislation, Democratic Scrutiny and International Relations 
 
The impact of the pandemic is not only undermining the UK-EU negotiations. It is 
impacting as well on necessary legislative preparations for the exceptional 
circumstances which arise from withdrawal from the EU. With reduced time available 
in the UK parliament and devolved legislatures, an extension would mean that vital 
parliamentary time is not diverted from focussing on the COVID-19 emergency. It 
would also help to ensure that all legislation required at the end of the transition 
period can be fully and properly scrutinised, including by the devolved governments 
and legislatures, ensuring it is fit for purpose.  
 
To take one example, the end of the transition period will mark the end of the 
influence of the EU environmental principles, and the governance function of the EU 
institutions, as they apply directly with respect to environmental law in Scotland. We 
are designing strong, domestic measures to underpin our environmental standards. 
And we are seeking to ensure that robust legislation is in place to underpin 
Scotland’s strong regulatory framework. However, both the legislative process and 
institutional development are significantly affected by the COVID-19 crisis. This 
creates risks to environmental standards, and to Scotland’s reputation for a clean 
natural environment, which could have consequences for our communities and for 
business and exports. An extension to the transition period would allow us time to 
put statutory measures in place, and so mitigate this risk. 
 
Even before COVID-19, the UK Government was already failing to provide the 
Scottish Government appropriate, meaningful engagement on or influence in the 
decisions which the UK Government sought to take as part of the UK-EU 
negotiations - despite the fact that many of those decisions fall within or impact on 
devolved responsibilities. The practical challenges of engagement during lockdown 
make such engagement more difficult, but the fact that negotiations have now begun 
makes it all the more vital.   
 
Meaningful engagement must be judged not by how many meetings the UK 
government has invited devolved governments to, but by whether the UK’s approach 
to the negotiations, with all its deep and widespread consequences for devolved 
areas of policy, is discussed and agreed among the four nations or prepared and 
decided upon unilaterally by the UK government.  Sadly at the time of writing the 
latter is still the case, as it has been throughout the Brexit process. The Scottish 
Government continues to press UK ministers at every opportunity to open up its 
processes and allow proper involvement of the Scottish Government and Scottish 
Parliament. 
 
Nor should we forget that COVID-19 has affected our neighbours in the EU just as it 
has affected people in the UK – and, like us, their attention and resource is rightly 
oriented to responding to the pandemic and saving lives. Even before COVID-19, for 
the EU the future relationship with the UK was just one issue, already reducing in 
importance, amongst a crowded number of priorities. Now, the Brexit negotiations 
must be of markedly less interest to the EU and its member states; and they will 
likely want to invest their limited resources and capacity accordingly. Indeed, one 
impact of COVID-19 might be for the EU to protect itself more forcefully against 
competitors that it feels are benefitting from an unlevel playing field. 
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The insistence by the UK Government to continue Brexit negotiations, despite our 
neighbours’ pressing need to direct their full attention and resource to fighting the 
COVID-19 pandemic, will inevitably undermine what sort of future relationship can 
practically be agreed, given the limited negotiating capacity available this year. It 
could, moreover, have negative implications for the UK’s international relations, 
reputation and standing more broadly. Care should be taken not to impose 
unreasonably, at this time, on the good will of the UK’s international partners. 
 
 
Conclusion on the Practical Challenges 
 
The UK government has cited various arguments for not seeking an extension.  
 
It argues that extending the transition period would create additional uncertainty for 
business. But in fact the main source of Brexit-related uncertainty is the fact that on 
our current trajectory, the UK will be leaving the Single Market and Customs Union 
arrangements at the end of December, but the successor arrangements have not yet 
been negotiated and a no-deal outcome is all too possible. The suggestion that the 
UK government can offset this enormous disruption by striking alternative trade 
deals in this time frame with other countries across the world is simply fantasy. 
Conversely, extending the transition period will avoid the compounded shock of 
Brexit and COVID-19, and offer breathing space for businesses during which they 
will, contrary to the UK government’s claims, have more certainty than at present. 
 
The UK government has also argued that the COVID-19 crisis makes it all the more 
important for UK to be free to make its own rules. But this is a global crisis that will 
require international co-ordination in policy responses. The EU and its Member 
States are our biggest international market and our most important partners. Now is 
the time to work with those partners, to aid our recovery process. The UK cannot face 
up to this global crisis effectively by cutting itself off from cooperation with Europe, or 
through the ‘global Britain’ approach.    
It is, unfortunately, true that, although the EU’s response to the crisis and its long 
term strategy will be important factors in the UK’s future prospects, the UK will not be 
well placed to influence them. However, this is an inevitable consequence of Brexit, 
and is not an argument against the benefits of an extension. 
Finally, the UK government argues that the fact that the UK would have to continue 
paying into EU budget is a reason for not extending the transition period. The date of 
31 December 2020 was chosen deliberately to coincide with the end of the EU’s 
seven-year budget cycle, and the Withdrawal Agreement already envisaged that 
agreeing a reasonable UK contribution for 2021 and 2022 in the event of an 
extension would require calculation and negotiation. Crucially, the size of the 
contribution (other than for specific programmes in which the UK wishes to 
participate) would, under the terms of the Withdrawal Agreement, need to be agreed 
before any decision to extend the transition period, so the UK Government would be 
able to take a decision on extension in full knowledge of the financial implications. 
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As our analysis clearly shows, the damage caused will be significant, it will last into 
the long term if not permanently, and it will be all the more serious if it is allowed to 
come at the end of 2020 when the economy will be reeling from the impact of 
COVID-19. Yet the some of the worst effects can be mitigated, by using the option to 
extend the transition period, pushing the impact of Brexit forward to a time when the 
economy will be less fragile, and prolonging the current certainty and visibility for 
businesses. An extension will also avoid the chaos that is otherwise inevitable at the 
end of this year given that, as we have clearly demonstrated, there is no way that 
governments or businesses can be ready for that date.    
This is not about, as the UK government seems to be suggesting, getting some short-
term inconvenience over and done with, rather than delaying it. It is about the risk 
that the end of the transition period, if allowed to fall at the end of this year, will be the 
straw that breaks the camel’s back for many Scottish businesses and, as a result, 
families. That outcome is not inevitable and it is not necessary.   
In a press conference on 24 April, EU chief negotiator Michel Barnier called on all 
parties to be realistic about what could be achieved in the negotiations against the 
backdrop of the global pandemic, urging: 
“…realism…to think about whether, in the midst of the terrible economic crisis 
that is forecast due to the coronavirus crisis, we will be able to reach an intelligent 
agreement that limits the shock that the UK's departure from the Single Market 
and Customs Union will entail in any case. It is only realistic to raise these 
questions and to remind ourselves of these deadlines.” 
 
The Scottish Government strongly endorses these remarks. Continuing to insist on a 
timetable that was set prior to the pandemic – and was in any event extremely tight 
given the complexities involved – would be utter folly. It would expose our 
businesses and citizens to the very real likelihood of the UK exiting the transitional 
arrangements with a poor deal or no deal at all. 
 
The practical difficulties highlighted in this chapter, and the absence of proper 
democratic scrutiny, along with the combined economic consequences of Brexit and 
COVID-19, make a compelling case for the transition period to be extended. In the 
next part of this document we set out how the breathing space created by an 
extension can be used constructively to factor in the long term changes that the 
COVID-19 crisis will bring about. 
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Section 2: How to Use the Breathing Space that an Extension to the Transition 
Period will Create 
 
 
2.1 The New Global Context   
  
 
In the previous sections of this paper we have set out the case for delaying the UK’s 
exit from the EU in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on 
Scotland’s immediate economic and social prospects.  
 
This section covers the post-COVID-19 global economic and political setting in which 
the UK will find itself. When the worst of the crisis is over, the global community will 
not return to the status quo ante, but will evolve towards an as yet undefined ‘new’ 
state. The UK government’s post-exit trade strategy, already questionable even 
before the COVID-19 crisis, is now wholly unrealistic because of it.    
 
Taken together, these considerations make a compelling case for using the 
breathing space created by extending the current arrangements beyond the end of 
2020 to reassess the relationship the UK Government envisages for the future 
relationship with the EU. 
 
Extending the transition beyond the end of this year is essential. But simply 
postponing a deeply damaging exit from the Single Market by two years without 
revaluating the impact of the kind of hard Brexit the UK Government currently 
favours, given the consequences of the coronavirus crisis, would also be highly 
questionable. 
 
For a range of industries, as well as the health and social care sector, the 
contribution of EU workers in Scotland has never been clearer, once again 
highlighting the damage of ending, permanently, freedom of movement.     
 
On the 3rd February, before the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic had become clear, 
the Prime Minister set out in a speech in Greenwich his vision for a future ‘global 
Britain’ in which the UK would be in the vanguard of a new era of global free trade. 
This would, he said, counter the trend towards trade conflicts and protectionism that 
has developed in recent years.    
 
The speech confirmed the central plank of the UK government’s approach to EU exit 
ever since the arrival of Prime Minister Johnson: that the UK could and would 
negotiate new trade deals with countries other than the EU with such rapidity, and of 
such quality, that the benefits from them would over time make up for the economic 
damage caused by exiting the EU – damage which is an inevitable consequence of 
the distant EU-UK relationship which the Prime Minister favours.  At the heart of 
‘global Britain’ would be a network of new trade agreements with countries such as 
the USA, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and Japan.  
 
Even before the COVID-19 crisis, this approach to the UK’s global future did not 
stand up to serious scrutiny. As mentioned earlier, the UK government has not even 
made serious headway into securing the many ‘continuity’ agreements with other 
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countries that are necessary to avoid the loss of the trading benefits the UK enjoyed 
as an EU Member State. The assertion that a network of complex new trade deals 
could be completed and implemented at breakneck speed during 2020, or even 
shortly after, and the benefits felt immediately, was always absolutely unrealistic. In 
reality, no real progress has been made towards these new deals, and with 
presidential elections in the USA scheduled for later in the year there seems little 
likelihood that UK-US negotiations will succeed in that timescale.   
 
Indeed EU trade commissioner Phil Hogan has recently suggested that the US 
government, and perhaps others such as South Korea, would be unlikely to wish to 
conclude a bilateral trade deal with the UK until the EU-UK negotiations have been 
completed, ‘because after all we are 450 million people in the European Union … 
Size matters in trade.’ The US Chamber of Commerce commented on 5 May: 
“it is vital that the UK secure a favourable trade agreement with the EU as 
quickly as possible. A continued lack of certainty about the way forward will 
continue to constrain inbound investment and risks limiting prospects for 
bilateral trade negotiations between the U.S. and UK. We continue to believe 
it makes sense for the UK to reset its relationship with the EU before it turns 
to setting the terms of its trade ties with other trading partners.” 
 
Aside from whether or not new trade deals could be in place by the end of this year, 
any objective economic analysis shows clearly that the scale of the potential impact 
would come nowhere near compensating for the huge losses caused by withdrawing 
from the EU’s trading system. The UK government’s own analysis shows that, for 
example, a Free Trade Agreement with the US would only increase UK GDP by up 
to 0.16% in the long term. This can be contrasted with reductions in GDP as a result 
of Brexit, compared with remaining in the EU Single Market and Customs Union, 
which Scottish Government modelling has estimated at between around 6% in an 
FTA scenario and 8.5% if the transition period ends with no deal. 
 
But in any case, in the few months since the Prime Minister delivered that speech, 
the world has changed.  
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has pushed the world into a deep recession. We do not 
know how long this downswing will last, or the impact it will have on the UK’s or 
Scotland’s future economic and trading prospects. World trade is expected to decline 
by up to 33% in 2020, and it is impossible to predict when it will fully recover.  In 
such an environment, history teaches us not only that the conclusion of new free 
trade agreements is unlikely, but that active protectionism becomes a real possibility.  
 
As a result, there is considerable uncertainty about how the international trading 
environment will unfold over the short-term, and how willing and able the UK’s 
putative trading partners will be to negotiate preferential agreements during this 
period. Even if the administrative bandwidth were to exist to engage in what are 
highly complex negotiations, in countries facing their own recovery challenges it is 
unlikely that the political will and popular support will exist to take forward such 
negotiations at this time. This uncertainty will add significantly to the burden facing 
our businesses as they struggle to recover from the damaging consequences of the 
pandemic. In both the private and public sectors, some organisations will need to 
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fundamentally review their business models – as illustrated below for one example 
sector. 
 
 
Example: Higher Education 
 
Scotland’s university sector is being hit hard by the coronavirus, Brexit and the 
proposals for a new UK immigration system. It has already been adapting to the 
changes Brexit is likely to mean for its world-leading research and education. 
Now added to that is the huge scale of the challenge that the COVID-19 virus 
brings, both in Scotland and worldwide. COVID-19 has already limited 
international travel, affecting both students and staff.  
 
Scotland’s reputation and performance as a global force in research is a vital 
national asset sustaining jobs and growth and ensuring that our people and 
economy are ready for the opportunities of the future. International research 
collaboration offers a beacon of hope as a key part of Scotland’s and the world’s 
response to tackle the coronavirus. A vibrant research and innovation sector will 
also have an important role to play in the post COVID-19 economic recovery 
period. 
 
However, in a post-COVID-19 post-Brexit world researchers will have more 
reason to consider where to take their expertise and their next project. In a survey 
by the University and College Union (UCU) in 2017, over three-quarters of EU 
academics at UK universities said that in light of the Brexit referendum result, 
they were more likely to consider leaving the UK higher education sector. 
Professor Lee Cronin, regius professor of chemistry at Glasgow University, has 
said that ‘if I can’t run a world-leading team of researchers here I’m not going to 
let the skills, knowledge and momentum we’ve built die because of a hard Brexit. 
Many of us will be forced to move our research abroad or seek joint affiliations in 
the EU.’30  
 
In addition, many universities in Scotland and the rest of the UK are truly global 
players in the education market, and have developed business models based 
around students coming to them to study from the EU and across the world. On 
top of the impact of Brexit on the likely numbers of EU students, in a post-COVID-
19 world the level of international student exchange that universities had been 
expecting will neither re-establish quickly nor in the same form as before, with 
inevitable consequences for their operational and financial strategies.  
 
 
Questions about countries’ future international strategies are linked to their decisions 
on their domestic recovery plans and strategies. Rather than viewing recovery as the 
global economy simply “bouncing back” from this COVID-19 health crisis, the 
Scottish Government fully supports the view that protecting our future requires us to 
consider measures that will ensure the economic system “bounces forward”. This 
means looking for economic, environmental and social policies, and coordinated 
international action, directed to increasing economic and social wellbeing and 
creating a framework for sustainable development which protects and restores 
nature for future generations.  
 
                                                          
30 Article by The Guardian, ‘There’s no plan B’: academics race to safeguard research against Brexit 
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Over the last few years the Scottish Government has increasingly placed our 
citizens’ wellbeing at the heart of Scotland’s national performance framework. This is 
an explicit recognition that the rate of economic growth alone cannot be regarded as 
the sole indicator of wellbeing. Not only must growth be inclusive – with added 
prosperity being shared equitably between our citizens and used to enhance our 
public services – but economic growth itself must be sustainable.  
 
The same reflections are being duplicated across the world. The importance of 
sustainable growth and a resilient economy are set to be at the centre of post-
pandemic recovery plan for many nations. For the EU, the European Commission’s 
Green Deal – designed to transform the EU into a sustainable and climate-neutral 
economy by 2050 – is a central component of the roadmap for recovery. By 
stressing increased investment in the fields of sustainable mobility, renewable 
energy, building renovations, research and innovation, the recovery of biodiversity 
and the circular economy, the EU has the potential to construct an economic and 
social framework at the heart of which is the wellbeing of its citizens. 
 
The Scottish Government’s objectives for inclusive and sustainable growth are very 
similar to those underlying the EU Green Deal.  
 
And with governments worldwide facing the same long-term challenges, international 
collaboration – especially with our closest colleagues and neighbours in the EU – will 
become even more beneficial than before, placing further question marks over the 
direction of the UK Government’s current policy towards the EU.        
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Conclusions 
 
 
In this document, we have set out how the COVID-19 crisis has radically altered the 
priorities for governments’ actions, across the world. When an event as important as 
the COP 26 climate conference later this year has had to be cancelled – an event on 
which literally the future of mankind and our planet depends – it is simply not credible 
to treat Brexit as an exception and plough on regardless.  
 
As we have explained, there are economic, practical and democratic reasons why 
the Brexit process cannot continue on its current timetable. The UK Government 
should immediately, and in any case by the end of June, seek the maximum two-
year extension of the negotiating period, as provided for in the Withdrawal 
Agreement.  
 
In Section 1, we have presented economic analysis that confirms how a failure to 
extend the transition will exacerbate the already huge damage caused to the 
economy by COVID-19. Recovery from the COVID-19 crisis should start to happen 
in Q4 2020/Q1 2021, but that is exactly when the risks associated with end of Brexit 
transition period will fall if there is no extension.  
 
We have also explained the practical difficulties faced by the public and private 
sectors in the absence of an extension. The EU-UK negotiations themselves have 
been disrupted. The need to deploy staff to work on COVID-19 means that 
government readiness for the end of 2020 cannot possibly be adequate, for example 
in arranging new systems for customs, immigration, export certification, and intra-UK 
frameworks. For businesses, ending the transition period in December would require 
them to cope with thousands of new administrative and regulatory obligations when 
they are already struggling to recover from, or in some cases simply to survive, the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Even if they had scope to begin their 
preparations, it is simply not possible at this stage to prepare properly for new 
arrangements which have not even been negotiated yet between the UK and the EU.  
By the time the outcome of the negotiations is known, it will be too late. In other 
words, extending the Brexit transition period is absolutely essential. 
 
We have also set out how the breathing space created by an extension should be 
used to review future strategy, given that the world will never look the same again as 
a result of the COVID-19 crisis. Nations will learn from their COVID-19 experience 
and revisit their strategies and business models, as will organisations in both the 
private and public sectors.   
 
The UK government’s ‘global Britain’ strategy, which did not stand up to serious 
scrutiny even before the COVID-19 crisis, looks even more hollow as a result of it.  
We need to have a much clearer sense of the new global context before throwing 
away the advantages of our trade arrangements with the EU itself, and of the EU’s 
trade agreements with other countries.  
 
Time is running out. As the Scottish Government our responsibility, indeed our duty, 
is to protect Scotland’s interests in the Brexit process. We are fully aware of the 
extent to which the UK government has staked reputational capital on exiting the 
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transition period at the end of 2020, but there are far more important things at stake 
than that. This is the time for the UK government to live up to its responsibilities and 
do the right thing, by securing an extension to the end of 2022. We call upon it to do 
so.  
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Annex A Results of Economic Modelling 
The graphs in this annex represent the same data as in Graph 1 and Graph 2 in the main body of this document, but disaggregated 
according to the two different, illustrative, COVID-19-recovery scenarios. 
 
Illustrative Scenarios of Possible Macroeconomic Paths of the Scottish Economy with a V-Shaped COVID-19 Recovery and a No-
Deal-Brexit Outcome at the End of 2020 and at the End of 2022 
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Illustrative Scenarios of Possible Macroeconomic Paths of the Scottish Economy with a V-Shaped COVID-19 Recovery and an FTA 
at the End of 2020 and at the End of 2022 
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Illustrative Scenarios of Possible Macroeconomic Paths of the Scottish Economy with a W-Shaped COVID-19 Recovery and a No-
Deal-Brexit Outcome at the End of 2020 and at the End of 2022 
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Illustrative Scenarios of Possible Macroeconomic Paths of the Scottish Economy with a W-Shaped COVID-19 Recovery and an 
FTA Brexit Outcome at the End of 2020 and at the End of 2022 
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Annex B – Examples of Difficulties for Businesses if the Transition Period 
Ends on 31 December 2020 
 
 
Hospitality, Tourism, Leisure 
 
The tourism sector has been severely impacted by COVID-19, with demand 
collapsing steeply. Recovery is expected to be gradual and slow, lasting far beyond 
2020: any additional barriers to recovery, will make that process all the more difficult 
and carry additional risks to jobs, businesses and growth. For example, six of 
Scotland’s top ten markets for overseas visitors were in the EU, and seven were in 
the EEA. Workers from the EU have been essential to the sector, especially in 
hospitality. The ending of free movement of workers from the EU will make it more 
difficult to recruit the necessary workforce.  
 
 
Food, Drink and Fisheries 
 
Failure to secure a comprehensive deal with the EU will pose risks to key areas of 
the food and drink sector in Scotland and the rest of the UK including high EU tariffs 
and non-tariff measures, including requirements for Export Health Certificates for 
Products of Animal Origin (POAO). These potential impacts would be exacerbated 
should measures be applied for trade between Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
 
Failure to reach a deal on the prioritisation of perishable products at the Short Straits 
crossing in particular would be detrimental for Scotland’s seafood exporters. These 
discussions were put on hold following the UK Government/EU agreement late last 
year, and our understanding is that they have not yet recommenced.  
 
Iain Wright, CEO of the UK Food & Drink Federation noted, on 3 February 2020, 
that: 
“The EU market is the largest source of UK food imports and the largest 
destination for UK food exports. This fact is driven by geography, shelf-life and 
customer tastes. Introducing friction into those supply chains will have 
implications for our largest manufacturing sector and for all food and drink 
consumers”. 
 
Some (EU) countries are already beginning to buy more locally as they look to 
restart and recover their national economies. As the UK leaves the EU’s trading 
arrangements, goods from the UK could become less desirable in European 
countries. 
 
The global markets that EU exit was meant to “open up” will be more difficult to enter 
with a reduced volume of air traffic (due to COVID-19). For example, over £100 
million worth of Atlantic salmon from Scotland are flown out of London airports. 
Freight rates have doubled or tripled putting this at risk, until air travel recovers. This 
is likely to increase rather than decrease the reliance on easy access to EU markets. 
In the current situation, it is likely that many of these businesses and the exports they 
sell will collapse especially if EU markets cannot be relied on while the multi-year 
global recovery occurs. 
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The areas which will be hardest hit by marine industry disruptions from the double 
impact of Brexit and COVID-19 recovery time would be already vulnerable rural 
communities. For example, Peterhead, Fraserburgh, Kirkcudbright, Lerwick and 
Ullapool are all classed as highly vulnerable to seafood sector shocks due to having 
areas within their communities where more than 20% of employment is from the 
seafood sector. Similarly, this will be an issue for vulnerable island communities that 
rely on this sector for their food and income. Spain, in particular, is a big market for 
their live shellfish exporters.  
  
The seafood sector in Scotland remains significantly dependent on non-UK labour; 
with EU nationals accounting for 58% of the workforce in the seafood processing 
sector, and non-EEA labour accounting for approximately 19% of crew in the 
Scottish fishing fleet. The ending of freedom of movement from the EU will, 
therefore, not only risk creating labour shortages in the seafood processing sector, it 
will also likely increase the dependence of the fishing fleet on non-EEA crew.  
 
Without corresponding changes to immigration rules, it is almost certain that non-
EEA labour will continue to be accessed through the use of transit visas. As well as 
creating an uneven playing field based on the geographic location and operational 
area of vessels, the transit visa route fails to provide basic employment rights and 
protections and may even be indirectly contributing to cases of maltreatment and 
exploitation. Along with “No Recourse to Public” status, this has also been the root 
cause of the significant hardship that non-EEA fishers have faced during the COVID-
19 outbreak and will continue to leave non-EEA fishers in a position of acute, and 
wholly unacceptable, vulnerability. 
 
One of the ways the fishing industry would have coped with the existing end of the 
transition period would be to temporarily adjust their operating models. For example 
Nephrops vessels could have reduced their catch/filled up cold stores and whitefish 
could have reduced their effort for a few months whilst things settled down. Having 
done this in response to COVID-19, it is unrealistic to expect surviving businesses to 
repeat this process for the end of the transition period. 
 
The fishing and aquaculture sectors are also intrinsically linked to and heavily 
dependent on supply chains with the EU, for example the time critical delivery of ova 
from Europe. The trout sector is currently importing most of its feed supply from 
Europe. Any disruption could cause significant animal health and welfare issues. The 
sector is also dependent on imports of veterinary medicines and equipment. 
 
From January 2021 EU seasonal migrant workers in the fruit and vegetables sector 
will be required to apply through the UK Government’s Seasonal Agricultural Worker 
Pilot Scheme (SWPS), subject to inclusion on the approved list of recruitment 
countries. There are also fees for both growers and workers. In Scotland the soft fruit 
sector was worth £134 million in 2017. The pilot is currently capped at 10,000 
workers for the whole of the UK, but it is estimated that around 70,000 workers are 
required across the UK annually.  
 
Retail 
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For the retail sector, the current end of the transition period comes with the worst 
timing. It clashes significantly with the run up to Christmas and January to March is 
the period of highest imports for fresh food. While there was considerable consumer 
demand during COVID-19, there were no problems with the Short Straits and 
availability of food. However, in relation to the requirements of the Northern Ireland 
Protocol, there are huge concerns that the infrastructure will not be ready in time, 
and consumer experience of COVID-19 has increased the risk of stockpiling and 
panic buying. To prepare for Brexit, many food businesses, especially in the SME 
sector, may decide to stockpile supplies and ingredients and are likely to struggle 
with cash flow and working capital. Dealing with the outbreak plus not extending the 
transition may well mean many businesses will not survive both. 
 
 
Downstream Oil and gas  
 
The downstream oil & gas sector, and refining sector specifically, is experiencing 
unprecedented market challenges at present. Refineries are strategically important 
to both Scotland and the UK’s economies, as are the significant employment and 
resilience contributions of the sector. Refineries operate in a global market 
predicated upon high volume product output, returning narrow margins. The collapse 
in crude price and plummeting demand for fuels (attributable to global travel 
restrictions in lockdown) are placing significant pressures on the sector, expected to 
endure throughout 2020 and perhaps into 2021. The economic landscape the sector 
operates within won’t become clear until the lockdown ends - and probably well into 
the recovery. This means that the sector does not have time to properly plan for 
leaving the EU on 31 December 2020. Its previous plans may well no longer be 
suitable, as the impacts of COVID-19 on international trade and supply chains are 
presently unknown. 
 
The end of the transition period brings with it the potential imposition of tariffs, should 
no FTA be concluded. This will mean that at a time when it is already vulnerable, and 
attempting to trade its way out of a COVID-19 depressed market, the refining sector 
will be met with a potential further increase in commercial and logistical pressure 
with alternative trading arrangements.  
 
The consultation on a proposed UK Global Tariff included rounding down the import 
tariff for petroleum products, which would go from 4.7% to 2.5%. %. This would have 
meant that, should the UK not have a deal with the EU, then petrol being exported 
from the UK to the EU would be subject to import tariffs in the EU of 4.7% but petrol 
imports from the EU into the UK would have been set at only 2.5% - placing 
domestic refineries at a competitive disadvantage with the risk of flooding the 
domestic market with foreign product. This particular tariff has since been revised 
from 2.5% to 4% in the UK Global Tariff published 19 May - affording greater 
protection for UK refineries. However, the tariff levels for petroleum products are still 
not entirely reciprocal, and we do not yet know whether a 0.7% disparity between 
imports and exports on petrol will have a material impact on the UK refining market, 
or will be absorbed by the supply chain. 
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An extra period of time within the EU’s trading arrangements would allow time for the 
refining market to plan for any forthcoming disruption to existing trading 
arrangements and understand more fully the long term changes imposed on them. 
 
 
Trade in goods  
 
Disruption is occurring at the EU-UK borders caused by COVID-19 response, with 
cold storage capacity nearly full and foreign sales crashing, particularly in seafood 
and red meat (which have lost 90% of their market). In addition, this disruption could 
result in excise goods being seized if they exceed the indicated journey time. The 
preparation businesses will have to undergo for new border arrangements will be 
complex, with new compliance measures that could implicate at least 200 hours of 
training, or outsourcing to customs intermediaries, of whom there is a shortage. 
 
 
Property  
 
A primary concern for the property market with regards to Brexit has been the loss of 
European Investment Bank (EIB) funding for infrastructure and further skills 
shortages due to lack of immigrant workforce. These concerns haven’t changed, and 
if anything, COVID-19 will make them worse; firstly, because funding put to COVID-
19 supporting measures (Job Retention Scheme, business grants etc.) might have to 
come out of the infrastructure investment funds; and secondly, the recession saw a 
significant decline in the construction workforce. This has been particularly true for 
SMEs, many of whom left the sector and didn’t return. Unless construction support is 
provided now and post-pandemic, we could see an equally negative impact. 
 
 
Manufacturing  
 
There are serious longer term repercussions on the skills pipeline for manufacturing 
sectors. Currently, the pipeline of engineering skills is at risk as businesses have 
either slowed or ceased recruitment due to COVID-19. Graduates and apprentices 
that make up our future workforce and are looking to begin their careers are left 
unemployed, and as time passes their skills will also depreciate. In addition, cash-
flow issues have severely impacted on manufacturers. The skills and training 
budgets tend to be one of the first areas to take a hit when businesses are pressed 
to make critical decisions around their budgets. This has resulted in redundancies 
where businesses have made cut-backs or closed permanently. Many of these 
redundancies will be affecting the older, ageing segment of the workforce. The 
restrictions on migration and uncertainty to the ability as to employ foreign skilled 
labour to supplement the workforce will exacerbate the problem further.  
 
Many manufacturing industries rely on broad transnational supply chains for end 
products and skilled workers, and whilst the potential for onshoring and creating 
more localised supply chains may be attractive, in terms of their recent benefits to 
resilience - the reality is that this will be difficult to achieve on the short term and 
within the limit of the current transition period deadline. 
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In terms of border and customs arrangements, the UK Government has confirmed 
plans to introduce import controls on EU goods at the border after the transition 
period ends on 31 December 2020, meaning that third country controls will be in 
place from 1 January 2021. As a result, traders in the EU and GB, including the 
pharmaceutical industry, will have to submit customs declarations and will be liable 
to goods’ checks. The situation for Northern Ireland and the associated protocol is 
even less clear. Whilst the UK Government is taking steps to encourage companies 
to be ready to ensure a smooth passage across borders, there are many 
interdependencies, such as the risk of lorries waiting in queues which could be 
critical for supplies such as medicines and pharmaceuticals. 
 
 
Medicines and Pharmaceuticals 
 
The UK government’s Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has a 
dedicated commercial supply team that plays an important role in managing 
shortages, receiving information that companies are legally obliged to provide. This 
involves tracking a limited number of reasonably manageable situations 
(approximately 80-100 at any one time), with a small number that can involve more 
serious clinical implications. The current pandemic is testing the capacity to manage 
shortages, and layering on potential EU related shortages could exacerbate this for 
DHSC and the industry. 
 
 
Construction  
 
The complex supply chains required in the construction sector are being affected by 
steep falls in trade during the COVID-19 response; according to Scottish Enterprise 
95% of Scottish construction firms are reporting supply chain impacts. If the EU 
withdrawal transition period is ended in December 2020, the new costs and 
administrative measures needed to import raw materials and equipment will intensify 
the challenges of managing the supply chain, reducing productivity just as recovery is 
needed. 
 
 
Trade in Services and Digital  
 
As a result of COVID-19, there is an increased resilience on digital trade, with a shift 
towards digital delivery of services. Digital trade is dependent on a trading 
environment which supports cross-border trade in services (‘mode 1’). Currently 
businesses trading digitally from Scotland and the UK benefit from the EU’s Digital 
Single Market. This allows for free flows of personal and non-personal data, minimal 
administrative burden and self-regulation on e-commerce, among other advantages. 
FTAs typically include fewer services commitments under mode 1 than the UK 
currently enjoys with the EU. Ending the transition period without a satisfactory EU-
UK deal on mode 1 and on data flows, alongside a lack of preparations needed to 
enable the transition, will put at risk the opportunity for digital trade to contribute to 
the economic recovery in Scotland and the UK.  
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Services trade could be hit hard in Scotland by the impacts of COVID-19, through 
transport and travel restrictions, as evidenced by the latest IHS Markit/Cips flash UK 
services purchasing managers’ index.31 There are now limitations in the way 
services can be provided internationally – services previously traded via mode 4 
(movement of persons) may now have to be provided via mode 1 (cross-border trade 
in services) due to global restrictions on travel.  
 
The end of the transition period will intensify these reductions, by increasing barriers 
to trade in services at a time when modes of service supply are already limited. 
Unless the EU-UK negotiations deliver a satisfactory outcome on cross-border trade 
in services, mobility, domestic regulation and Mutual Recognition of Professional 
Qualifications and sufficient support and communication to businesses on the 
practical detail of new trading arrangements, many businesses will struggle to adapt 
to the new way of working. This could include the requirement to have a physical 
presence in the EU to continue trading Businesses need time and support to 
transition, which will not have been provided by the end of the transition period.  
 
ONS data shows SMEs have a higher reliance on imports from the EU, with the 
highest reliance on imports of computer programming services and to services 
auxiliary to financial services. Increased trade barriers would increase the cost of 
imports from the EU and result in increased costs for SMEs.  
 
 
Transport  
 
For some sectors such as ferry services in Scotland and rapid freight (HGV drivers), 
continued access to EU-based crew is important. For example, Eastern European 
crew are used extensively on the Serco Northlink Ferries’ Freighter services from 
Aberdeen to Lerwick and Kirkwall and on the Pentland Ferries’ services across the 
Pentland Firth. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the road freight sector faced a 
shortage of HGV drivers, and any new barriers to employing EU drivers would 
exacerbate this.  
 
EU goods and services, including parts, machinery and access to EU-based skilled 
engineers and technicians, are also important in order to build, maintain and repair 
ferries. Minimal delays are important in relation to the import of goods and to entry 
visas or permissions for specialists to enter Scotland, to keep ferry services running. 
Often, only EU nationals are allowed to repair and maintain specialist systems to 
maintain warranties on EU produced equipment such as engines, radar systems etc. 
Once the COVID-19 restrictions are relaxed, there will be a rush for the supply of 
materials and goods. That logistical challenge could be further compounded if new 
border restrictions are imposed following the end of transition, particularly where 
Scottish transport depends on contractors from Ireland and the rest of Europe, 
whose supply chains are often located within their home countries. 
 
Brexit may lead to delays in ferry crossings between Scotland and Northern Ireland 
due to any increased checks for UK-EU traffic. The impact of these delays on freight 
traffic, and the consequent need to implement Operation Stack at Cairnryan, could 
                                                          
31 https://www.markiteconomics.com/Public/Home/PressRelease/c2c5efa8283e40a4b780ff8f45d9c9e2  
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be exacerbated if there are COVID-19 restrictions in place relating to physical 
distancing or there is reduced capacity to manage the challenges, due to sickness. 
 
 
Culture and Creative 
 
In the culture and creative sector, the COVID-19 pandemic has caused demand 
across the sector to severely decrease, following the introduction of restrictive 
measures. There have been severe disruptions to supply and the cross-border 
workforce. Recovery in some areas will be difficult, due to widespread lack of 
financial resilience and a reliance on public-facing activities such as performances 
which COVID-19 has halted. The sector is largely made up of freelancers, 
microbusinesses and SMEs which are often financially insecure. All of this will be 
exacerbated if EU funding streams, such as the Creative Europe Programme, are no 
longer available from January 2021.  
 
Disruption to trade, and mobility, with EU countries from January 2021 would 
severely affect the sector’s prospects of recovery, especially regarding the need for 
specialised overseas recruitment, and outward movement for touring and exhibiting. 
Scotland’s international festivals have faced unprecedented disruption due to 
COVID-19, and immigration controls could severely hamper their recovery too. The 
important computer games industry also works extensively across borders and will 
be similarly affected.  
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Annex C – Government Readiness for 1 January 2021 
 
Example: Pharmaceuticals 
 
It was always the case that Brexit would create a risk of disruption to trade and 
delays at the border with the potential to cause medicine shortages in the UK. The 
COVID-19 situation has already resulted in difficulties in this area; it has created 
global shortages in areas like protective equipment and has disrupted supply 
chains. 
 
The default position within the UK at the end of the transition period is that ‘no 
deal’ legislation covering a number of processes involved in the licensing of 
medicines should come into force. But given the very short time until the end of 
2020, and the global focus on COVID-19, if there is no extension to the transition 
period then the timetable is very tight for ensuring that future requirements and 
processes are in place. For example, the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill, 
which seeks to create targeted and delegated powers that enable updates to 
regulatory systems for human medicines, clinical trials, medical devices and 
veterinary medicines, is currently paused. 
 
The UK Government’s Approach to Negotiations document did mention medicinal 
products, and proposed that there should continue to be cooperation and 
information sharing with the EU. It did not include alignment with the European 
Medicines Agency (EMA). 
 
One of the consequences of a more distant relationship between the Medicines 
and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) and the EMA could be the 
loss of access to the single marketing authorisation (licence) offered by the EMA. 
This would mean that in order for a pharmaceutical company to market a new 
medicine in the UK they would have to undergo a separate approval process by 
the MHRA. This extra regulatory hurdle for the pharmaceutical industry, and the 
additional costs involved in the process, could make the UK a less attractive 
market for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies’ innovative new 
medicines. Emerging from a pandemic, and searching for a vaccine, is the worst 
possible moment to disrupt these approval processes. 
 
It is far from clear what outcome this UK government approach might deliver – 
making it impossible at this stage to prepare with certainty the new regulatory 
arrangements within the UK which will be needed.   
 
 
  
58 
 
 
 
Example: New UK immigration system 
 
Immigration is a matter currently reserved to the UK government, but one which 
has huge implications for the wellbeing of Scotland’s economy and society. The 
Scottish Government has made clear that the approach to immigration being taken 
by the UK government will not meet Scotland’s needs. The independent Expert 
Advisory Group on Population and Migration anticipate that, even after the UK 
government reduced its proposed salary threshold from £30,000 to £26,500, this 
would lead to a reduction of net migration to Scotland of 30-50%, and this would 
be particularly felt in rural and remote areas. 2017-18 data shows that there were 
143,000 EU nationals (aged 16-64) employed in Scotland. 
 
Implementing a whole new system by 1 January 2021 always presented a huge 
challenge for the Home Office which was also responding to the recommendations 
of the Windrush enquiry and implementing the EU Settlement Scheme. The Home 
Office has acknowledged this but has signalled no intention to review the 
timescale, despite the huge amount of work that would be needed between now 
and the end of 2020. 
 
For example, the Home Office has tasked the Migration Advisory Committee with 
consulting employers on a new Shortage Occupation List and making 
recommendations by the Autumn. This task seems extremely challenging at a time 
when companies are focussed on coping with the impact of COVID-19, and when 
it is highly unlikely that they will know with any certainty what their international 
staffing needs for 2021 will be. 
 
Moreover, the pandemic has confirmed the Scottish Government’s view that the 
UK government’s approach was never fit for purpose. In that approach there would 
be no general route for what the UK Government term ‘lower-skilled migrants’, who 
have traditionally come from the EU via free movement of persons. Yet the 
COVID-19 crisis has exposed the fact that individuals in these so-called ‘low 
skilled’ sectors play an essential role in our economy, and indeed many have been 
classified for COVID-19 purposes as ‘key-workers’: food processors and 
supermarket workers; delivery drivers; nurses and care workers. With the 
exception of NHS and higher-skilled health workers, none of these roles would be 
eligible for a visa from 1st January 2021. By their own admission the UK 
Government has no plans to revise or change their plans, despite the reliance on 
these individuals as highlighted by the current situation.  
 
Workforce shortages arising from COVID-19 will be exacerbated by the end of the 
transition period. Clearly the UK government must rethink its approach to future 
immigration. But this is simply not possible within the timeframe the UK 
government has imposed upon itself with no extension to the transition period.  
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Example: Security and law enforcement cooperation 
 
Ending the transition period at the end of 2020 creates serious risks to the security 
aspects of the EU-UK future relationship. Where new arrangements cannot be in 
place for 1 January, bearing in mind that they still remain to be negotiated, the 
inevitable consequence is at best a hiatus and at worst a permanent loss of the 
security cooperation from which we have benefited for so long.   
 
EU exit means fundamental changes to the legislative and technical frameworks 
through which the fight against international and extraterritorial criminality takes 
place. The legislative requirements to deliver future co-operation with the EU need 
to be considered, drafted, scrutinised and passed in order to ensure continued and 
effective future cooperation with EU institutions and Member States, and the 
technical solutions which give effect to that legislation, if necessary, must be able 
to operate effectively with respect for data security and data protection standards. 
For example, technical changes to the way that Scotland can access information in 
the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS), if something akin to 
ECRIS access is negotiated, may take months to design and implement.  
 
Similar challenges exist with regards to the Schengen Information System and 
Prüm Convention capabilities. Whatever the eventual outcome of the EU-UK 
negotiations for these instruments, it will be a significant institutional and finance 
challenge to implement and operationalise our future law enforcement and 
cooperation arrangements before 31 December 2020. The pandemic adds to the 
pressure on those resources, and dramatically increases the risk that even no-deal 
contingency plans may not be fully delivered come 2021.  
 
Loss of access to cooperation platforms such as Europol and Eurojust, without any 
alternative from 1 January 2021, would be seriously detrimental to the work of our 
police and prosecutors. Without an extension, the EU will treat the UK as a ‘third 
country’ from that date. While cooperation between the EU and third countries 
without a specific agreement in place is possible in certain circumstances, the 
volume of cases and information that is shared between Scottish and EU partners 
means that such ad-hoc procedures are not a sustainable solution if the level of 
protection of the public we have enjoyed as a Member State is to be preserved.  
 
As of May 2020, COPFS estimate that there are over 600 High Court and 1600 
Sheriff and Jury pre-conviction cases which are indicted awaiting trial and cannot 
progress at this stage due to the pandemic and suspension of jury trials. In 
addition, there are 21,000 summary cases at pre-conviction stage. For as long as 
the pandemic affects the capacity of justice system to process cases, the backlog 
will increase. It is accordingly expected that the total number of outstanding trials 
at all levels of the Scottish criminal justice system will number in the tens of 
thousands by the end of the year and transition period. Although some jury trials 
will run from July 2020, the number of trials which can run simultaneously is likely 
to be less than would normally be the case. This backlog will require to be dealt 
with at the same time as the transition period ends, adding yet another challenge. 
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